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A recurrent theme of modern "conservative" political theory
has been the asserted illegitimacy of "government by the judiciary"
in a representative democracy. As the Supreme Court appointees
of the Republican presidents of the 1970's and 1980's have gradually replaced the members of the "Warren Court," a somewhat
more restrictive doctrine governing access to the federal courts
might therefore have been expected to emerge.
Indeed, this has occurred. A distinguishing characteristic of
the Burger Court has been an emphasis on problems of justiciability (and related questions of implied private rights of action)'
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964; L.L.B. Stanford, 1967. The author gratefully acknowledges the thoughtful
comments of Professor Robert E. Riggs.
1 See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); California v. Sierra Club, 451
U.S. 287 (1981); University Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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which serve to limit the parties entitled to invoke the power of the
federal courts. In the sixteen years since the appointment of Chief
Justice Burger, the Court has issued over seventy opinions dealing
with questions of standing, ripeness, and mootness. The overall
tendency of these decisions has been to restrict access to the federal
judicial forum. This development, which strikes at the core of the
historic role of the federal courts as guarantors of federal constitutional and statutory rights, has been the subject of extensive scholarly commentary. 2 Nonetheless, it is valuable to review the
Supreme Court's decisions on justiciability at this juncture, after
more than a decade of development, during which the characteristic points both of the Court's new justiciability doctrine and of its
critics have become relatively well defined.
I.

Central Characteristics of the Burger Court's
Justiciability Decisions

A.

Overriding Concern with the Separation of Powers and Federalism

Almost from the beginning, the Burger Court's justiciability
decisions have emphasized separation of powers and federalism
concerns in applying the standing, ripeness, and mootness components of the doctrine ofjusticiability. They thus differ significantly
in emphasis from such leading Warren Court decisions as Flast v.
Cohen.3 In Flast, the Court had recognized that the justiciability
doctrine embodied two "complementary" but different limitations:
the first, to "limit the business of federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed
as capable of resolution through the judicial process"; the second,
to "define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation
of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas
2 See, e.g., Albert, Justiciability and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50
S.C.L. REV. 1139 (1977); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979); Marshall & Flood, EstablishmentClause
Standing: The Not Very Revolutionary Decision at Valley Forge, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 63 (1982);
Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68 (1984); Nichol, Causationas a Standing Requirement: The UnprincipledUse ofJudicial Restraint, 69 Ky.L. REV. 185 (1980); Scott, Standing
in the Supreme Court: A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973); Sedler, The Assertion
of ConstitutionalJus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1308 (1982); Sedler,
Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposalsfor Legislative Reform, 30 RUTGERS
L. REV. 863 (1977); Tushnet, The Sociology of Artice III, A Response to ProfessorBrilmayer, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Pleafor Abandonment, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977); Varat, VariableJusticiabilityand the Duke Power Case, 58 TEx. L.
REV. 273 (1980). See generally 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 24:1-25:16 (2d
ed. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 3-7-3-29 (1978); 13, 13A C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3529-3533.11

(1984).
3 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 264 (1962).
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committed to the other branches of government." 4 As to "standing," the Court concluded that the question whether a particular
person is a proper party to maintain an action did not, of itself,
raise separation of powers problems. Such problems arise only
from the substantive issues the individual brings before the court.
It followed that in construing article III limits, the only standing
concern was whether the dispute would be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable ofjudicial
resolution.
In contrast, the Burger Court's justiciability decisions, taken as
a whole, have elevated separation of powers and closely related federalism5 considerations to a primary, perhaps predominant, role in
interpreting and applying all aspects of the justiciability doctrine,
including the question of standing. In Laird v. Tatum,6 the Court, in
holding that persons subjected to allegedly illegal Army surveillance had no standing to sue based on an alleged "chilling effect"
on their first amendment rights, concluded that to permit an action
based on such a "generalized grievance" would be inconsistent
with the separation of powers postulate implicit in article III.
Carried to its logical end, this approach would have the federal
courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and
soundness of Executive action; such a role is appropriate for the
Congress acting through its committees and the "power of the
purse"; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present
or immediately threatened
injury resulting from unlawful gov7
ernmental action.
Similarly, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,8 the
Court rejected citizen standing to maintain an action claiming that
the armed forces membership of members of Congress violated the
incompatability clause, 9 resting heavily on separation of powers
concerns. The Court reasoned that the standing requirement of
concrete injury not only "adds the essential dimension of specificity" to permit informed judicial resolution, 10 but also ensures that
constitutional adjudication, "the most important and delicate" of a
court's responsibilities, "does not take place unnecessarily."" To
4 392 U.S. at 95.
5 For a discussion of the relationship between federalism and separation of powers
concerns, see note 26 infra.
6

408 U.S. 1 (1972).

7 Id. at 15.
8 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
9 U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 2.
10 418 U.S. at 221.
11 Id. In the Court's view, the existence of concrete injury not only insures that there is
a need for judicial review to protect the complaining party's interest, but also insures the

framing of relief limited to the precise facts of the case. Id. at 221-23.
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permit one without concrete injury to obtain judicial resolution of
constitutional issues in the abstract would "distort the role of the
12
Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature."
Justice Rehnquist reiterated this theme in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, Inc. ,'3 in
which the Court confined Flast's authorization of taxpayer suits
challenging public expenditures on establishment clause grounds
to the narrowest possible compass. 14 The Court emphasized that
the power of judicial review "'is legitimate only in the last resort,
and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy.' "15 Standing requirements ensure that legal questions will not be resolved in the "rarified atmosphere of a debating
society."' 6 The Court also recognized, however, that the exercise
of the judicial power affects relationships between the coequal
branches of the national government. Thus, the judicial branch
should neither "shrink from a confrontation with the other two coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor. . . hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other
branches of government where the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury."' 17
12 Id. at 222. In a companion case, United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), in
which the Court rejected taxpayer standing to challenge CIA accounting methods under
the accounts clause of the Constitution, the Court was unimpressed by the argument that if
taxpayers could not maintain such actions, no one could: "In a very real sense, the absence
of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument
that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the
political process. Id. at 179. Justice Powell, a central figure in the Burger Court's evolving
justiciability doctrine, elaborated on this theme in his concurring opinion. In his view,
"[r]elaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial
power." Id at 188. He considered such expansion to be inimical to a democratic form of
government, see id. at 188-9 1, and advocated the prudent exercise ofjudicial review lest the
representative branches attempt to curb the power, id. at 191.
Justice Powell was also concerned with the ability of the judiciary to perform its traditional role if it were forced to resolve all public interest suits brought by taxpayers. He felt
that its limited resources were better used to protect individual and minority rights against
oppressive or discriminatory government action. This traditional role allowed the judiciary
to retain public esteem and "permitted the peaceful coexistence of the counter majoritarian
implications ofjudicial review and the democratic principle" of the federal government. Id
at 192.
13 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (5-4 decision).
14 Valley Forge involved the standing of an organization dedicated to the separation of
church and state to challenge HEW's conveyance of surplus government property to a
church-affiliated college. The Court held that the organization had no standing: Its members lacked taxpayer standing because the complaint did not challenge an exercise of the
taxing and spending power as in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), id. at 476-82, and they
lacked standing as citizens because they raised only a "generalized grievance," id. at 48287. See notes 44-63 infra and accompanying text.
15 Id. at 471 (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345
(1892)).
16 Id at 472.
17 Id at 474. Article III is not a "troublesome [prudential] hurdle to be overcome if
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The Court's consistent emphasis on separation of powers concerns reached its zenith in Allen v. Wright,1 8 holding that parents of
black public school children had no standing to challenge the adequacy of IRS procedures for denying tax exempt status to private
schools which discriminated on the basis of race. The Court found
that the parents had not shown the requisite "causal connection"
between the IRS's policy and the racial composition of the public
schools.' 9 Justice O'Connor expansively stated that "the law of Article III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers." 20 In the majority's view, standing inquiries "must
be answered by reference to the Art. III notion that federal courts
may exercise power 'only in the last resort, as a necessity,' . . . and
only when adjudicatioi is consistent with a system of separated
powers and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable
of resolution through the judicial process." 2 1 The Court sought to
avoid "suits challenging, not specifically identifiable government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to
carry out their legal obligations," which "are rarely if ever appro22
priate for federal-court adjudication."
There is reason to criticize some of Justice O'Connor's language, if taken literally. For example, the assertion that article III
standing doctrine reflects the "single basic idea" of separation of
powers ignores the fact that the standing inquiry also focuses on
ensuring that a case is presented in a form traditionally viewed as
suitable for judicial resolution. 2 3 On the other hand, Justice
O'Connor accurately concluded that the prior standing decisions of
the Burger Court establish that separation of powers and federalism concerns are strongly implicated in the determination of who
may invoke the power ofjudicial review, as well as in determining the
possible so as to reach the 'merits' of a lawsuit, . . . [but] a part of the basic charter
promulgated by the Framers of the Constitution. . . which created a general government
and provide[s] for the interaction between that government and the governments of the
several States." Id. at 476.
18 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984) (5-4 decision).
19 See notes 59-61 infra and accompanying text.
20 104 S. Ct. at 3324.
21 Id. at 3325 (citations omitted).
Justice Stevens sharply questioned this line of of analysis in his dissenting opinion,
arguing that separation of powers concerns provided no real guidance in determining
whether the plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient causal connection to establish standing. Id. at
3345. He stated that if the majority meant to require a more direct causal connection when
a case involved troubling separation of powers implications, its approach "confuses the
standing doctrine with justiciability." Id. at 3345. Standing analysis focuses primarily on
the complaining party, and the strength of his interest in the outcome is not related to
whether the relief sought intrudes upon the prerogatives of other branches of government.
22 Id. at 3329.
23 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 84, 94-101 (1968). Indeed, the majority view in
Flast was that this was the sole focus of standing doctrine.
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scope of review. 24 Surely, as the Court has repeatedly stated, the
role of the judiciary in relation to the other branches and state governments is much greater if it is empowered to review executive
and administrative action at the request of interested bystanders
than if its power of review may be invoked only by a smaller group
who are immediately threatened with injury to a claimed legal interest of their own. Moreover, to the extent that interpreting the injury, causation, redressability, ripeness, and mootness components
of justiciability analysis involves uncertain questions of degree-as
it does25-a process of judicial line-drawing is inevitable. Justice
O'Connor correctly concludes that in drawing the line between
proper and improper exercises of the power of judicial review, a
Court should not ignore the underlying separation of powers concept that the role of the judiciary is to resolve concrete and specific
claims of violation of legal right, rather than to review executive
and administrative policies and programs in the abstract. Nor,
under our system of reserved state powers and delegated national
powers, is there persuasive reason to conclude that the role of the
federal judiciary in relation to the representative branches of state
government should be greater than with respect to those of the na26
tional government.
24 Justice Stevens assumes that ripeness, reviewability, and political question considerations maintain an appropriately limited role for the judiciary. See note 20 supra. IfJustice
Stevens includes within his concept of "reviewability" the idea that an issue may be reviewable only at the request of a particularperson orgroup, but not the request of others, his position
would arguably serve separation of powers concerns. But if, as appears more likely, his
position is that separation of powers concerns are fully satisfied by the power to determine
that an issue is subject to limited or no review in general, the conclusion is more questionable. Justice Stevens' view is frequently advanced in the commentary. See, e.g., 4 K. DAvIs,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 24:21 (2d ed. 1983).
25 See parts VII, VIII infra.
26 In Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), the Court suggested that its concept of limited
"judicial" power reflects federalism as well as separation of powers concerns. Id. at 476.
This idea has born fruit in a number of the Court's opinions. In O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488 (1974), the Court held that citizens of Cairo, Illinois, did not present ajusticiable
controversy to enjoin allegedly unconstitutional bail, jury fee, and sentencing practices,
even on the assumption that they had been subjected to the challenged practices in the
past. Moreover, the Court found that an injunction would intrude into the normal workings of the state criminal process without any showing of the inadequacy of the remedies
available within the state system, id.
at 499-504, but the "need for a proper balance in the
concurrent operation of federal and state courts counsels restraint against the issuance of
injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the State's criminal laws
in the absence of a showing of irreparable injury which is 'both great and immediate' "id at
500 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)).
Similarly, in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), the Court expressed "serious
doubts" whether citizens of Philadelphia presented a justiciable claim for injunctive relief
against an allegedly unconstitutional pattern of police misconduct against minority citizens
simply because they had been able to demonstrate a number of specific past instances of
misconduct. Id. at 371-73. The Court also concluded that beyond the question of justiciability, respondents' invocation of the federal courts' equity power to supervise a local
police department was "novel" and unacceptable. Id. at 377-80. In the context of our
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In sum, a dominant theme of the Burger Court's justiciability
decisions has been that separation of powers and federalism concerns are strongly implicated not just in determining whether the
character of an issue insulates it from judicial review under the
political question doctrine, 27 in the broader doctrine of "reviewability" developed under the Administrative Procedure Act,2 8 and
in determining whether an issue is sufficiently ripe for judicial intervention. 29 They also lie at the heart of determining who may invoke
the processes of a federal court to obtain review of a particular issue. In the Court's view, to permit invocation of the judicial process by one who has no legitimate claim to call upon the resources
of the court-be it a public interest plaintiff who has suffered no
personal injury, a plaintiff who has suffered no immediate injury to
federal system, "appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief." Id. at 389.
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the Court followed O'Shea and
Rizzo in holding that a citizen subjected to an allegedly unconstitutional chokehold by the
police presented a justiciable claim for damages, but not for prospective injunctive relief.
The Court noted that article III requirements "shade into" those governing the availability
of equitable relief. Id. at 103. Even assuming that the pending damages claim accorded
Lyons standing to seek prospective injunctive relief, issuance of an injunction absent a
showing of any "real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again" would
disturb the "proper balance between state and federal authority." Ia at 111, 112.
O'Shea, Rizzo, and Lyons couched their discussion of federalism heavily in terms of equitable restraint governing the federal courts, rather than limits on the nature of ajusticiable
controversy imposed by article III. But the Court's opinions make clear that it sees no
sharp line dividing these inquires. For example, in Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984),
the Court relied on the results in O'Shea, Rizzo, and Lyons, in reaching the conclusion that
the separation of powers concerns implicit in article III supported the denial of standing to
parents of black public school children. Id. at 3330. It seems apparent that the limited
concept of justiciable "case" which the Court has derived from separation of powers considerations when federal offical action is challenged has in fact been viewed as fully applicable to challenges to state official action as well.
This development is, on the whole, unobjectionable. There is no principled or historical basis for concluding that the original Constitution, augmented by a Bill of Rights directed literally only to the national government, intended to confer a broader power of
judicial review with respect to the actions of state officers than those of federal officers.
Moreover, the history of the Civil War Amendments and the Reconstruction civil rights
legislation provides no support for the conclusion that in subjecting the actions of state
officers in violation of federal law to broadened federal judicial review and control, there
was an intent as well to alter the understood meaning of ajusticiable case. See generally 6 C.
FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

RECONSTRUCTION AND

REUNION, 1864-1888 (1971); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MicH. L. REV. 1323 (1952). "Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. There is the essential postulate that the controversies, as
contemplated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character." Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
27 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Burger Court has not departed from
the narrow compass accorded the political question doctrine under Baker v. Carr.
28

See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982). See generally 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE,

chs. 28, 29 (1984).
29 See part VI infra.
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an arguable claim of legal right, or a plaintiff who cannot trace its
injury to the challenged conduct 3 0 -is to expand the role of the fed-

eral courts beyond the limited cases of "necessity" envisioned by
the Framers. 31 The thesis developed here is that, on the whole, the
Burger Court's heightened focus on the "identification" component of standing and justiciability doctrine is a healthy one. It is
more consistent with the limited role appropriate for the unrepresentative branch in a representative democracy than the concept
that an interested bystander, or a person suffering injury but who
has no arguable claim of impairment of any personal legal right,
may subject allegedly unlawful programs or policies to judicial review. At the same time, the Court's doctrine preserves full access
for those whose rights are truly at stake, and provides an ample role
for the legislative branch in expansively defining substantive rights
and conferring private rights of action in the public interest.
B. Increasing Definition and Particularization
A second distinguishing characterisitic of the Burger Court's
justiciability decisions has been a consistent effort to clarify and
particularize the somewhat amorphous concepts that had emetged
in prior law. This effort has manifested itself primarily in the
Court's decisions on standing, although it is also evident to a lesser
32
extent in its treatment of ripeness and mootness concerns.
Warth v. Seldin33 may represent the high water mark of this tendency. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court sharply differentiated
the "constitutional" from the "prudential" aspects of standing, the
first of which focuses solely on whether the plaintiff has alleged injury in fact which was caused by the defendant's conduct and which
is likely to be redressed by judicial relief.34 In addition to this
''minimum constitutional mandate," standing doctrine involves
prudential considerations which are "closely related to Article III
concerns but [are] essentially matters ofjudicial self-governance." 35
These include the prohibition against the assertion of "generalized
grievances," the doctrine that a plaintiff normally must assert his
"own legal rights and interests," and the requirement that the
"constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests
30 See notes 41-63 infra.
31 As developed below, the Court has viewed the question of the nature of the right
asserted by an injured plaintiff as central to the process of identification of the proper plaintiff to present ajusticiable controversy, consistent with the limited constitutional role of the
federal judiciary, although it has characterized such considerations as "prudential" rather
than constitutional. See text accompanying notes 64-92 infra.
32 See parts VI, VII infra.
33 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
34 Id. at 499-500, 503-05.
35 Id at 500.
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properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's
position a right to judicial relief. ' ' 36 Because such concerns are prudential, they may be outweighed in some circumstances by "countervailing considerations." 3 7 Moreover, Congress may grant an
express right of action to persons who would otherwise be barred
by prudential standing rules. 3 8 Since Warth, the Court has frequently reiterated this highly defined approach to the standing
39
doctrine.
Against this background, this article examines the Court's justiciability decisions in more detail. In doing so, it departs somewhat from the Court's careful compartmentalization ofjusticiability
doctrine into "constitutional" and "prudential" concerns. This division is artificial, and in some cases misleading. Some of the principles which the Court has characterized as prudential are better
understood on constitutional grounds. At the very least, the line
between justiciability requirements imposed as a matter of constitutional interpretation and those imposed by the Court as a matter of
"judicial self governance" is hazy. It may be more useful to focus
simultaneously on both constitutional and prudential restrictions as
they bear on the primary areas of focus of the Court's justiciability
decisions-injury to the plaintiff, the immediacy or remoteness of
that injury, and the assertion of "third party rights." In each of
these areas, two subsidiary inquiries may usefully be considered.
First, should the Court's decisions be viewed as discriminatory denials of access to the federal courts for resolution of claims of right
which are not favored on the merits, as some critics suggest? 40 Or
do they represent a value-neutral retreat to "first principles" of
constitutional governance, as the Court itself has so often stated?
Second, has the Court's more refined articulation of the various
components of justiciability doctrine-particularly its increasingly
elaborate approach to questions of third party standing-ade36 Id. at 499-500.
37

Id. at 500-01.

38 Id. at 501. In Warth, the Court also somewhat inconsistently observed, first, that the
minimum constitutional requirement of injury in fact could exist "solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing,'" and, second, that the
power of Congress to grant standing to persons otherwise barred by prudential standing
rules was "subject to Article III's minimum requirement of distinct and palpable injury in
fact." Id. at 501, 502.
39 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472-75 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 74-81 (1978); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976).
40 See, e.g., Davis, Standing 1976, 72 Nw. L. REV. 69, 82 (1977); Sedler, Standing and the
Burger Court, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 863, 873 (1977); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea
for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 686 (1977); Nichol, Book Review, 98 HARV. L.

REV. 315, 421-23 (1984).
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quately explained the results that have been reached? Or has the
Court subscribed to an analytical structure which produces inadequately explained results and the appearance of tendentious hostility to assertions of certain disfavored rights?
II.
A.

Injury

Distinct and Palpable "Injury in Fact" as
the ConstitutionalMinimum

The Court has repeatedly stated in its recent opinions that the
core article III standing requirement is that a plaintiff allege and
prove that he has suffered "distinct and palpable" "injury in fact"
as a result of the defendant's challenged actions. 4 1 Some critics of
this approach have argued that to the extent that the "injury in
fact" requirement is intended to ensure concrete adverseness and a
case suitable for judicial resolution, it misses the mark. Given the
long-accepted view that even a trifling injury gives the plaintiff
standing to sue in appropriate cases, 4 2 the injury in fact doctrine
must only roughly relate to the ultimate objective of assuring adequate presentation of the case before the Court. So long as the
matter is not advisory, collusive, or moot and does not present a
political question, a "public" plaintiff who has suffered no personal
injury in fact but who has a burning ideological interest in the resolution of the question presented-demonstrated by his maintenance of the action-may be in as good or even a better position to
43
present the issue as one directly injured.
A prominent characteristic of the Burger Court's standing decisions, however, is the rejection of the ideological plaintiff, at least
absent express congressional authorization for them to commence
actions as private attorneys general. In United States v. Richardson,4 4
the Court concluded that a federal taxpayer had no standing to obtain a declaration that the Central Intelligence Act violated the article I requirement for a regular account of the receipts and
expenditures of public moneys. 4 5 Richardson did not involve a challenge to an exercise of the taxing and spending power, as did Flast;
there was thus no "logical nexus" between plaintiffs complaint and
his status as a taxpayer. The case was instead controlled by Froth41 E.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
42 E.g., 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:01 (2d ed. 1983) (citing United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973)).
43 See, e.g., Tushnet, The Sociology of Artice III,A Response to ProfessorBrilmayer, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1698, 1709-12 (1980).
44 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (5-4 decision).
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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ingham v. Mellon, 46 in which the Court had denied taxpayer standing
to challenge an expenditure of public funds allegedly in violation of
the tenth amendment. The Court in Richardson concluded that
while the barrier to taxpayers' suits erected by Frothinghamhad been
"slightly lowered" by Flast, the principle that a taxpayer could not
use a federal court as "a forum in which to air his generalized griev7
ances about the conduct of government" remained unimpaired.4
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court strongly implied that
its holding was grounded in article III itself rather than in any pru48
dential limitation.
The Court then appeared to change course in its treatment of
the "generalized grievance" limitation in Warth v. Seldin, 4 9 decided
one year after Schlesinger50 and Richardson. Justice Powell, writing
for the majority, characterized the generalized grievance rule as a
matter of "judicial self governance" which was intended to prevent
the judiciary from unnecessarily impinging on areas which could be
46 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
47 418 U.S. at 174 (quoting Flast v. Cohn, 392 U.S. 83, 114 (1968)). In Richardson, the
plaintiff's claim was that without detailed information on CIA expenditures, he could not
intelligently exercise his franchise. 418 U.S. at 177. The Court found that his claim was
merely a generalized grievance. Id. at 176-77. The majority was untroubled by the idea
that if the plaintiff could not obtain judicial review, then arguably no one could. This bolstered the conclusion that the matter was "committed to the surveillance of Congress and
ultimately to the political process." Id. at 179.
48 Id. at 179 ("Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Article IIIjurisdiction does not
impair the [citizen's] right to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls.") (emphasis added). In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell agreed that broad recognition of
citizen or taxpayer standing would undermine the legitimacy ofjudicial review in a representative democracy. Id. at 188-9 1; see note 15 supra. Unlike the majority, Justice Powell
made it clear that he considered the "generalized grievances" limitation to be a prudential
one that might be overridden by Congress. Id. at 196 & n.18.
The same theme is evident in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208 (1974), in which Chief Justice Burger again wrote for the majority. In rejecting a claim of citizens' standing, the Court characterized the plaintiffs' alleged interest
in assuring the faithful performance of legislative duties by reservist members of Congress
as "an abstract injury" for the claimed violation would "adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance." Id. at 217. The Court drew support from its decision in Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), which had precluded a
challenge to Justice Black's appointment to the Supreme Court as a violation of the ineligibility clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. See 418 U.S. at 219-20. More concrete injury was
essential if the case was to be presented with sufficient specificity to provide the Court with
a "complete perspective upon the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of
facts undergirding his grievance." Id. at 220-21. No matter how intense or effective, "mere
interest in a problem" was not sufficient to create standing. Id. at 266 (quoting Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)). As in Richardson, the Court's opinion was focused on
the requirement of article III rather than on any prudential aspect of standing requirement.
49 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (5-4 decision).
50 In Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), plaintiffs
who challenged the legality of members of Congress holding reserve commissions in the
armed forces were denied standing as either citizens or taxpayers. Their interests were
common to the public at large and they failed to satisfy the nexus requirement of Flast.
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more competently addressed by other governmental institutions. 5 1
The Court's decision in Warth did not turn on this point. Nonetheless, the idea that the "generalized grievance" limitation is wholly a
prudential one appeared frequently in the Court's subsequent
52
standing decisions.
In Valley Forge,53 however, the Court again invoked article III
underpinnings for the doctrine. 54 Plaintiffs contended that they
had standing as citizens to raise their establishment clause challenge to a transfer of surplus property of the United States to a
church affiliated college. In upholding standing, the court of appeals had distinguished Schlesinger and Richardson on the ground
that, unlike the constitutional provisions involved there, the establishment clause arguably created a "personal constitutional right"
to a government that did not establish religion, the violation of
which conferred standing. 5 5 The Supreme Court emphatically rejected this contention, not in prudential,but in constitutionalterms. The
Court found that there was no "principled basis" on which the
rights asserted in Schlesinger and Richardson could be distinguished
from that in Valley Forge.56 The only injury identified by plaintiffs
was "the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III, even though the
disagreement is phrased in constitutional terms." 5 7 The business
of the federal courts is not to correct constitutional errors, but to
resolve cases and controversies, and the Court was "unwilling to
countenance such a departure from the limits on judicial power con51 422 U.S. at 499-500.
52 See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979); Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978).
53 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see notes 13-17 supra. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim of
taxpayer standing because they did not challenge an exercise of the taxing and spending
power as required by Flast, but of Congress' power under the property clause, U.S. CONST.
art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
54 The Court repeated the view that article III, at an irreducible minimum, requires the
complaining party to show injury in fact as a result of the defendant's conduct, and that
beyond this, as a prudential matter, the "Court has refrained from adjudicating 'abstract
questions of wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively
shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches." Id. at 475 (quoting Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975)).
55 Americans United For Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. United States, 619
F.2d 252, 265 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
56 454 U.S. at 484; see notes 62-63 infra and accompanying text.
57 454 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added). The intensity of plaintiffs' interest in the problem
was irrelevant because the "concrete adverseness" contemplated by the standing doctrine
is "the anticipated consequence of proceedings commenced by one who has been injured in
fact." Id. at 486.
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tained in Article III." '
In Allen v. Wright,5 9 the Court similarly refused to recognize alleged "stigmatic" injury of black parents of public school children
as sufficient to confer standing to challenge the adequacy of IRS
procedures to deny tax exempt status to racially discriminating private schools. The plaintiffs' children had not applied for admission
to these schools. Although noneconomic injury can be fully cognizable, standing based on racial discrimination extends only to those
personally discriminated against. 60 The Court stated: "Recognition
of standing in such circumstances would transform the federal
courts into 'no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value
interests of concerned bystanders.'. . . Constitutionallimits on the role
61
of the federal courts preclude such a transformation."
The Court's treatment of the issue of the "generalized grievance" raises a number of questions. The characterization of this
aspect of modern standing doctrine as prudential undoubtedly reflects the Court's concern that it not foreclose Congress from conferring broad public interest standing on taxpayers or interested
citizens in appropriate cases if it wishes to do so. Yet, the Court's
discussion of the generalized grievance limitation in Schlesinger and
Richardson has a distinctly constitutional tone. This could perhaps
be dismissed as the product of lack of adequate consideration for a
potential congressional role, rectified by the Court's more careful
articulation in Warth, if not for the constitutional emphasis of Valley
Forge and Allen v. Wright. Perhaps the Court meant to suggest some
limitation on Congress' power to confer public interest standing.
Does the nature of the "generalized grievance" limitation depend
upon the type of generalized claim asserted? Is the limit on taxpayer standing wholly prudential, whereas the limit on the assertion
of the generalized interest of citizens in constitutional governance
constitutionally compelled?
Even assuming that the "generalized grievance" rule is a prudential one, the question remains of when, if ever, it is appropriate
for the Court to depart from it without explicit congressional sanction. The Court has not directly addressed this question, but in
Sierra Club v. Morton, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, observed that "the fact that particular environmental interests are
shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial process." 6 2 This
58

Id. at 490 (emphasis added); see also Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3326-27

(1984).
59 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).

60 Id. at 3327; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1972).
61 104 S. Ct. at 3327 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
62 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
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is surely true. If the IRS assessed a one cent surcharge on all
United States taxpayers without congressional authorization, then
none would question that each had standing to challenge the illegal
tax, despite the fact that the grievance is a "generalized" one. That
the injury is an economic one is not the critical point of distinction
from Schlesinger, Richardson, Valley Forge, and Wright, for the Court
has made clear that noneconomic injuries are sufficient to satisfy
63
the "injury in fact" component of its article III standing doctrine.
On what ground, then, can the cases rejecting a generalized concern with constitutional governance be distinguished from the tax
case involving a trifle?
Before venturing to answer these questions, it is useful to examine another major aspect of the Court's treatment of the "injury" component of the standing doctrine-the nature of the injury
sufficient to establish standing to sue. The Burger Court's treatment of this subject begins with Justice Stewart's opinion in Sierra
Club. While rejecting the standing of the organizational plaintiff on
the ground that the complaint did not allege that any of its members had personally suffered injury as the result of the defendants'
actions, the Court emphasized that "injury in fact" sufficient to satisfy the standing requirements of section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act64 (and, implicitly, the requirements of article III),
was not limited to economic injury. "Aesthetic and environmental
well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of
65
the quality of life in our society."
The Court continued its apparently expansive approach to the
nature of the "personal" injury that will establish standing to sue in
Trafficante v. MetropolitanLife Insurance Co. ,66 in which it held that the
"person aggrieved" language of section 810(d) of the fair housing
63 See text accompanying notes 91-92 infra.
64 "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
65 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972). The Court also observed that:
[Tihe trend of cases arising under the APA and other statutes authorizing judicial
review of federal agency action has been toward recognizing that injuries other
than economic harm are sufficient to bring a person within the meaning of the
statutory language, and toward discarding the notion that an injury that is widely
shared is ipsofacto not an injury sufficient to provide the basis for judicial review.
Id. at 738. The Court held that Sierra Club nonetheless lacked standing because it had not
alleged that any of its members would personally suffer aesthetic or environmental injury.
Because the Court's holding appeared to turn on an easily cured pleading deficieny, it is
difficult to argue that Sierra Club evidences any ingrained hostility to assertions of environmental interests. This conclusion is born out by the Court's subsequent decision in the
SCRAP case. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). While one could argue that Sierra Club and SCRAP were
"early" Burger Court decisions and that the tone of later decisions is to the contrary, that
assertion is not supportable.
66 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
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provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was intended to define
standing as broadly as article III permits. Under this standard, both
a white and a black tenant of an apartment complex that had allegedly discriminated against nonwhite rental applicants had standing
based on their allegations that they had been denied the social benefits of living in an integrated community. The Court focused on
the legislative history of the housing provisions, which tended to
show that proponents of the legislation believed that those who
were not the direct objects of discrimination had an interest in ensuring fair housing. 6 7 In their concurring opinion, Justices White,
Blackmun, and Powell-three "centerists" whose views are particularly important in detecting the likely trend of decisions on the
Court-relied heavily on the broad language of the private right of
action provision, and suggested that they would have found article
III injury in fact to be lacking absent the statutory authorization to
sue.

68

In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures69 (SCRAP), the Court not only held that damage to environmental interests was sufficient to support standing in actions
seeking judicial review under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, but, in apparent contradiction to later decisions requiring a strong demonstration of causation, based standing upon a
lengthy and speculative chain of contingencies. In SCRAP, unlike
Sierra Club, the plaintiffs had specifically alleged that they used the
forests, streams, mountains and other resources allegedly adversely
affected by the challenged freight rate increase. The Court recognized that the environmental injury alleged in SCRAP, if it could be
established, was shared by "all persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and indeed all who breathe its air." 70 Nonetheless, standing would not be denied, for "[t]o deny standing to
persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also
injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Gov71
ernment actions could be questioned by nobody."
67 Id. at 210. It reasoned that "we can give vitality to § 810(a) only by a generous
construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by
racial discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of the statute." Id. at 212.
68 Id. at 212 (White, J., concurring).
69 412 U.S. 669 (1973). For a discussion of SCRAP's causation analysis, see text accompanying notes 217-20 infra.
70 412 U.S. at 687. Plaintiffs alleged that if the challenged freight rate increase were
put into effect, it would discourage the use of recyclable materials and encourage the use of
new raw materials, thus adversely affecting the environment by encouraging mining, lumbering and other extractive activities. Plaintiffs alleged that their use of forests and streams
would be impaired by the unnecessary destruction of timber and extraction of raw materials
and the accumulation of otherwise recyclable materials. Id. at 676.
71 Id. at 688.
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In Warth v. Seldin, the Court addressed the injury question only
in passing. It observed that "the actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.' "72 The Court
thus apparently endorsed the suggestion ofJustice White's concurring opinion in Trafficante that congressional action may, in some
way, create constitutional "injury in fact" which would not otherwise exist.
Following Warth, the Court continued to recognize impairment
to a wide variety of noneconomic and intangible interests as sufficient to constitute article III injury in fact. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina EnvironmentalStudy Group,73 plaintiffs challenged the provisions
of the Price-Anderson Act limiting liability in the event of a nuclear
accident. The Court held that the "thermal pollution" of bodies of
water used by the plaintiffs for recreational purposes and the "nonnatural radiation into appellees' environment" that allegedly would
be caused by the construction and operation of nuclear power
plants constituted sufficient injury to accord them standing.74 The
Court concluded that there was no need to rely on the uncertain
prospect of injury resulting from a future nuclear accident.
In Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,75 the Court once again
considered a "statutory" standing issue under the fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. It concluded that section
812 of the Act was intended to extend standing to the fullest scope
permitted by article III of the Constitution. The Court sustained
the standing of the Village of Bellwood to challenge the alleged
racially discriminatory "steering" practices of the defendant realtors on the ground that its tax base might be diminished by in72 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). The Court relied on Sierra Club and on dictum in Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), in which the Court observed in a footnote: "It is,

of course, true that 'Congress may not confer jurisdiction on Art. III federal courts to
render advisory opinions,'. . . . But Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute."
IdL at 617 n.3 (citations omitted).
73 438 U.S. 59 (1978). In Duke Power, standing was apparently not based on the broad
authorization ofjudicial review of the Administrative Procedure Act.
74 Id. at 73-74. The Court relied upon its prior decisions in SCRAP and Sierra Club.
Other Justices were less sanguine about the Court's injury analysis. Justice Stewart
would have remanded the action with directions to dismiss the complaint, even assuming
that but for the Price-Anderson Act's limitation of liability provisions the nuclear plants in
question would not have been constructed. "Surely there must be some direct relationship
between the plaintiffs federal claim and the injury relied on for standing." Id. at 95 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgement) (original emphasis). Justice Stevens expressed the
same concern. In a footnote he pointed out that many statutes facilitate the financing of
public projects, but "[olne would not assume. . . that mere neighbors have standing to
litigate the legality of a utility's financing." Id. at 103 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
75 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
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creased segregation of the community attributable to such
steering. 76 As to four individual respondents who were residents of
the "target area" of the steering practices, standing was sustained
on the Trafficante theory that denial of the benefits of living in an
integrated community constituted sufficient injury. 77 Justice Powell's majority opinion noted that although Congress could pass legislation removing the prudential limitations on standing, it could
not abrogate the article III minima: A plaintiff must always have
suffered " 'a distinct and palpable injury to himself.' "78 Contrary to
prior intimations, then, the Court suggested that there might be
some undefined limit of Congress' power to create legal interests
the impairment of which will create injury sufficient to support
standing to sue.
The Court's apparently expansive approach to the injury component of the standing doctrine collided with its hostility to the assertion of "generalized grievances" in Allen v. Wright and Valley
Forge. In Wright, the Court recognized the seriousness of stigmatic
injury to those directly discriminated against, but declined to recognize standing in all members of the stigmatized racial group. 79 In
Valley Forge, a narrowly divided Court rejected a claim of citizen
standing based on the contention that the establishment clause created a "personal constitutional right" in each citizen.80 Plaintiffs'
complaint failed to identify any "personal injury suffered by the
plaintiffs as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other
than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees," and that was held
not to be an injury sufficient to confer standing under article 111.81
76 Id. at 110-12.
77 Id. at 112-15. The Court rejected the argument that while such an injury might suffice within a single apartment complex as in Trafficante, it should not be recognized within
the larger area of an entire neighborhood, for it found no categorical distinction between
the two injuries. Id. at 114. The Court did recognize, however, that a neighborhood might
be so large or lacking in "shared social intercourse" that injury of the kind alleged would
not exist. Id.
78 Id. at 100 (citations omitted).
79 See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
80 The majority stated that "the assertion of a right of a particular kind of Government
conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the
requirements of Article III without draining those requirements of meaning." 454 U.S. at
483. The norm of governmental conduct established by the establishment clause could not
be differentiated from that created by other provisions of the Constitution. "We know of
no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary 'sliding scale' of standing which might permit respondents to invoke the judicial power
of the United States." Id. at 484.
81 Id. at 485-86 (original emphasis). The majority professed adherence to its earlier
holdings that noneconomic injury might constitute injury in fact, but concluded that plaintiffs had not "alleged an injury of any kind, economic or otherwise, sufficient to confer standing." Id. at 486 (original emphasis). The challenged property transfer had occurred in
Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs resided in Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C. and
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Justice Brennan's dissent for himself and Justices Marshall and
Blackmun rested primarily on the ground that whether article III
"injury in fact" exists frequently turns on the nature and source of
the claim asserted. The question is whether the plaintiff has a "legal
right under the constitutional or statutory provision upon which he
relies." 8 2 The dissenters contended that the Court "makes a fundamental mistake when it determines that a plaintiff has failed to satisfy

the

two-pronged

'injury-in-fact'

test

. . . without

first

determining whether the Constitution or a statute defines injury,
and creates a cause of action for redress of that injury, in precisely
the circumstance presented to the Court."83 They concluded that
when the federal government moves funds from the citizens to the
ministry, "each . . . federal taxpayer suffers precisely the injury

that the Establishment Clause guards against." 8 4 Flast "did not depart from the principle that no judgment about standing should be
made without a fundamental understanding of the rights at
issue." 8 5

The court returned to more comfortable ground in its unanimous opinion in Haven Realty Corp. v. Coleman.8 6 The primary issue
was whether black and white "testers" had standing to challenge
racial steering under section 812 of the Fair Housing Act, which the
Court had interpreted in Gladstone to extend as far as article III of
the Constitution would permit. 87 The Court upheld the standing of
a black tester on the ground that section 804(d) of the Housing Act
learned of the transfer in a news release. The Court stated that plaintiffs had no "special
license to roam the country in search of governmental wrongdoing and to reveal their discoveries in federal court." Id. at 487. In a footnote, the Court rejected a claim of standing
under the broad standing provisions of the APA because "neither the [APA] nor any other
congressional enactment, can lower the threshold requirements of standing under Art. III."
Id. at 487 n.24.
82 Id. at 492-93 (emphasis added).
83 Id. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 509. Justice Brennan distinguished
Frothingham'srejection of taxpayer standing primarily on the ground that taxpayers in general have no substantive right to complain of unlawful expenditures of their tax dollars:
they lack the "required legal interest because the Due Process Clause. . .does not protect
taxpayers against increases in tax liability." Id. at 499 (emphasis added). The majority's
means of distinguishing Flast, that Valley Forge involved executive rather than congressional
action and the disposition of surplus property rather than direct expenditure of public
monies, was wholly mechanical and artificial. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion agreed
that the majority's distinction of Flast tended to "trivialize the standing doctrine" and argued that Flast quite clearly rested on the special character of the establishment clause. Id.
at 513-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that the history of the
establishment clause demonstrated that it was explicitly designed to preclude state taxation
for the support of religious institutions, id. at 500-04, and that the taxpayer was the direct
and intended beneficiary of the prohibition on financial aid to religion, id. at 504.
85 Id. at 508-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
87 See notes 75-78 supra and accompanying text. In Gladstone, the issue of tester standing had been abandoned in the Supreme Court and the question was reserved.
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precluded false representations to "any person" on account of race
that housing was not available when in fact it was. The black tester
had suffered the precise injury that the statute was to guard against
and so had standing. 88 On the other hand, the white tester, who
had received correct housing information, had no standing because
he had not suffered the injury contemplated by the statute. 89 The
Court also sustained the standing of HOME, an organization dedicated to obtaining equal opportunity in housing in the Richmond
area, on the ground that defendants' alleged racial steering practices impaired its counseling and referral services. 9 0
In its unanimous 1984 decision in Heckler v. Matthews,9' the
Court again considered the injury component of standing doctrine.
A male retiree alleged that a provision of the Social Security Act
applying an offset for other pension payments to nondependent
men, but not to certain excepted nondependent women, constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws. If the challenge was
successful, the plaintiff would achieve no financial gain: a severability provision provided that if the exception to the offset provision
were held invalid, the offset would not be eliminated, but would be
extended to the women previously excluded. The Court nonetheless upheld the plaintiff's standing. Justice Brennan's opinion for
the Court relied upon the very "legal interest" analysis that he had
advanced unsuccessfully in his Valley Forge dissent. He reasoned
that apart from any financial gain, the denial of equal treatment
''can cause serious non-economic injuries to those persons who are
personally denied equal treatment solely because of their member92
ship in a disfavored group."
As in the case of the Court's "generalized grievance" doctrine,
review of the Court's treatment of the "injury in fact" required to
establish standing raises a number of questions. The Court has indicated a willingness to recognize nontraditional interests-including the subjective and intangible interests of environmental and
civil rights plaintiffs. But this liberal view has, with the exception of
Duke Power, manifested itself almost entirely in cases involving inter88 Id. at 373-74.
89 Id. at 374-75.
90 Id. at 378-79. The Court expressed doubt that the individual plaintiffs had suffered
the "injury in fact" of being denied the benefits of living in a racially integrated community.
Although such injury had been recognized in Trafftcante and Gladstone, plaintiffs in this case
alleged only that they were residents of the area where defendants' had engaged in steering. Such allegations, unlike those relating to an apartment complex or relatively compact
neighborhood, were insufficient to show that the alleged steering had affected the plaintiffs'
own interracial associations. The case was remanded to allow the plaintiffs to plead their
injury with more particularity. Id. at 375-78.
91 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984). Accord Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
92 104 S. Ct. at 1395.
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pretation of broad statutory standing provisions such as section 702
of the Administrative Procedure Act, or the private right of action
provisions of the Fair Housing Act. The Court's explanation for
this is that standing is found in such cases because article III injury
may be based on the violation of an interest created by a statute, as
well as more traditional forms of economic injury.
This explanation has superficial appeal, which diminishes on
closer examination. If the Court were concerned solely with "injury in fact" as the constitutional minimum, then why should congressional recognition of an injury be necessary to accord article III
significance? If denial of the benefits of interracial association or
misrepresentation to a tester are "injuries in fact" when recognized
by Congress, why are they not "injuries in fact" without congressional recognition? If injury to the intangible interest in the quality
of the environment is constitutionally cognizable under the broad
judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, why
is it not equally cognizable apart from the Act? Duke Power may be
read as holding that such environmental interests are generally cognizable without a special statutory basis; however, it is not clear how
such interests are to be distinguished from the interests in Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens Realty, in which the Court quite clearly
rested standing wholly on the existence of special statutory standing provisions.
The Court's treatment of the congressional role has produced
other ambiguities. It has held that Congress can create legal interests the impairment of which satisfies the injury in fact requirement
of article III. At times it has suggested that this power is unlimited,
while at other times it has suggested that this power is subject to a
bedrock constitutional requirement of injury in fact which exists
prior to and apart from congressional recognition. 93 Which view
applies is of critical significance in light of the broad citizen standing provisions found in much current legislation, not all of which
can be seen as merely recognizing some pre-existing injury, and
some of which appear to encroach on the Court's general proscrip94
tion against basing standing on "generalized grievances."
Another question arises from the interrelationship of the
Court's view that statutory provisions may create legal interests the
93 See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
94 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437h (1982) (Federal Election Campaign Act); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a) (1982) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982) (Clean
Air Act); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 n.4, 11-12 (1976) (concluding that "at least
some" of the plaintiffs accorded statutory standing by § 437h of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 had the necessary "personal stake" to present a case or controversy
under article III). See generally 4 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:4 (2d ed.
1983).
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violation of which create standing, and its frequently reiterated
"prudential" rule that "generalized grievances" are not judicially
cognizable. If Congress can override this "prudential" rule, why
may not the Constitution itself do so? This is the point argued by
Justice Brennan in his Valley Forge dissent.
These difficulties strongly suggest that something is amiss in
the Court's elaborate articulation of the standing doctrine in Warth.
"Injury in fact" is a poor vehicle for assuring concrete adverseness
and a case suitable for judicial resolution. The circumstances in
which intangible interests will support standing are poorly differentiated from those in which they will not. The kinds of "generalized
grievances" which will provide access to the judicial forum are not
clearly distinguished from those which will not. And the role of
Congress, while obviously important, appears to rest on superficial
premises and is of uncertain scope.
The problem, however, may be merely one of emphasis. As
previously noted, the Court has deemphasized the requirement that
a plaintiff, in order to present ajusticiable controversy, must allege
a violation of his own legally protected interests. Beginning in
Warth, the Court has repeatedly characterized as "prudential" the
requirement that a plaintiff's claim be within the "zone of interests"
protected by the statute or have some "nexus" with the challenged
conduct, and its refusal to entertain assertions of "generalized
grievances" and third party rights. But on the Court's own premises, these matters are of more fundamental concern. The driving
force of most of the Burger Court's significant justiciability decisions is not a concern with assuring the presentation of issues in a
form suitable forjudicial resolution, but a preoccupation with questions of separation of powers and federalism-in short, a focus on
the proper role of the federal judiciary in our system of separated
federal powers and reserved state powers. Thus, the justiciability
decisions of the Court are designed primarily to limit the group of
plaintiffs potentially capable of presenting issues with sufficient
concrete adverseness to those whose invocation of the power ofjudicial review is most consistent with the constitutional premises regarding the proper role of the federal judiciary.
The "generalized grievance" doctrine would then represent a
constitutionally grounded view that opening the federal courts to
an interested citizen who asserts no peculiarly individual rights
would be inconsistent with the judicial role envisioned by the Framers. Widespread grievances such as the "trifle" exacted by a universal illegal tax, or the environmental injury alleged in SCRAP,
may still be justiciable; the individual is viewed as asserting the impairment of a legal interest which is, in some sense, peculiar to himself, and not merely an abstract concern with government in
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accordance with the law. The constitutional standing inquiry, in
short, turns on whether the plaintiff's claim is arguably within the
"zone of interests" protected by the statutory or constitutional
guarantee asserted.
Just as the Court's focus on "injury in fact" as the touchstone
of constitutional standing is unsuited to identifying those litigants
who have a sufficient stake to assure adequate presentation of a
controversy, it is also unsuited to identifying litigants whose invocation of the judicial process is consistent with a properly limited judicial role. From a separation of powers and federalism standpoint,
there is as little reason to grant access to the judicial process to a
person who has suffered incidental injury as a result of governmental conduct which injures no arguably protected right of his own, as
to the concerned citizen or public interest organization. Both
might have a strong interest in obtaining a favorable resolution of
the question. If the role of the judiciary is viewed as the vindication
of individual rights where it is necessary to do so, however, neither
has any logical claim to a right to invoke the judicial power. One
who claims no legal entitlement of his own, but who has suffered
from some adverse collateral consequence against which the law
provides him no protection, is no more entitled to access to the
federal courts than one who has suffered no injury at all.9 5
This perspective makes the role of Congress more comprehen95 The Fourth Circuit relied on these premises in Leaf Tobacco Exporters Ass' v. Block,
749 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1984). The court held that leaf tobacco exporters had no standing
to challenge a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture to permit a tobacco growers' cooperative to sell directly to foreign purchasers. Since it concluded that the statutory scheme had
been enacted to protect the interests of tobacco growers, not exporters, the exporters were
not within the zone of interests protected by the statute. Id. at 1112-16. In its view, the
zone test "rests on the need to secure the benefits of a statutory program for the groups
that Congress intended to benefit," id. at 1111, and "prevent[s] groups outside of the [protected] class from usurping the legislative enactment," id at 1115. Thus, the zone test
"furthers the general recognition of standing doctrine that the decision to enforce legal
rights usually belongs to the possessor of those rights," id. at 1111 , and "permits government officials to act in furtherance of congressional purposes without the prospect of protracted court challenges from those whose interests Congress clearly did not protect," id. at
1116.
The court emphasized its view that the zone test was "prudential" and not "constitutional"; however, the primary thrust of this observation was to preserve the power of Congress to modify the test. Id. at 1112. The zone test is better understood to rest on
constitutional premises.
Although expressed somewhat differently, the analysis suggested here is not in conflict
with Professor Brilmayer's focus on questions of "self-determination" as important determinants ofjusticiability doctrine. See Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Artie III: Perspectives on
the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 H~Av. L. REv. 297, 311-14 (1979). Although she
declines to ground such considerations wholly on separation of powers arguments, id. at
303, her views are broadly consistent with a theory focused on appropriately limiting the
role of the judiciary in a representative democracy. Where those whose rights are at stake
do not wish to assert them, it is institutionally inappropriate as well as philosophically questionable to allow interested by-standers to do so.
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sible. The significance of congressional authorization is not simply
in creating injury, but in conferring an arguable claim of legal right
on those who seek to invoke the judicial proress. Thus, the injury
in Trafficante is cognizable only with congressional sanction, not because the denial of the benefits of living in a integrated community
was not an "injury" prior to congressional recognition, but because
it was unrelated to any arguable claim of legal entitlement until that
time.
Under this approach, there is no underlying, pre-existing
"core" of article III "injury in fact" which limits congresssional
ability to grant standing to public interest plaintiffs. Congress' ability to create legal interests-including an interest in every citizen in
compliance with a particular constitutional provision or statutory
scheme-is limited only by the scope of its enumerated powers
under the Constitution, and not by some judicial conception that
the class of plaintiffs is too large, or that the interest created is too
abstract. This is not to assert that Congress can override the separation of powers concerns inherent in the Constitution, or the appropriate limits on the judicial power inherent in article III. But so
long as the controversy presented is real and immediate, the judgment sought is not advisory, and the suit does not infringe on the
constitutional prerogatives of the executive. Article III contains no
principled basis for limiting Congress' power to create private
rights of action-and thus claims of legal entitlement-in broad
groups of private attorneys general or the citizenry at large beyond
those limiting Congress' power to enact substantive legislation
96
generally.
The result in Valley Forge would thus turn, not on a "prudential" rule that generalized grievances should not be entertained by
the federal courts, but on the rejection on substantive grounds of
the claim espoused by Justice Brennan that the establishment
clause creates a personal legal right in every citizen to assure the
constitutional use of his public subsidies. One may quarrel with
this result, but at least it would rest on a principled interpretation
of the Constitution, rather than the unsatisfactory generalized
grievance doctrine.
Moreover, the result in Valley Forge, which rejected both taxpayer and citizen standing to challenge a transfer of surplus property of the United States, may be unimportant in relation to Flast's
continuing authorization of suit by federal taxpayers to challenge
96 See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:5 (2d ed. 1983) ("On the question whether Congress may determine who has standing, the relevant provision could be
Article I, which confers upon Congress the power to create legal rights. If Congress may
confer rights upon a class of persons, Congress may also confer rights to be plaintifls.") (emphasis
added).
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public expenditures on establishment clause grounds. The artificiality of the Court's distinction of transfers of surplus property from
expenditures of tax dollars in Valley Forge suggests that Flasthas become a doctrinal outrider. While the Court has undermined Flast's
doctrinal foundations, however, it has, by preserving its result, in
effect accepted Justice Brennan's contention that the establishment
clause creates a personal constitutional right in each federal taxpayer to avoid coerced financial support of religion in the most im97
portant category of cases.
Similarly, standing in Heckler v. Matthews was based solely on a
denial of equal treatment without the prospect of any tangible financial gain, since the Constitution creates a legal interest in equality of treatment under the law. 98 In contrast, in Roe v. Wade, the
intangible discomfort caused by a married couple's apprehension
that an abortion might not be available in the event the wife should
become pregnant contrary to medical advice was insufficient to confer standing. 99 The result is explicable, not because that alleged
impediment to the couple's marital happiness was not an "injury,"
but because it was an injury against which the law provides no arguable claim to legal protection. The only legally protected interest
arguably asserted by the couple was the invalidity of the challenged
restrictions on abortion. Whether the couple would be subjected to
this illegality depended upon the future contingencies of contraceptive failure, pregnancy, and a desire for an abortion; therefore,
100
there was no actual case or controversy.
This approach faces a number of obstacles. It is difficult to reconcile such decisions as Duke Power and Laird v. Tatum with a standing doctrine which focuses on the nature of the interests
asserted.' 0 ' Further, such a focus appears to hark back to the now
discredited view that a party must establish the existence of a "legal
97 The result in Valley Forge can be rationalized with this view on the ground that disposition of previously purchased surplus property does not increase the burden of any current
taxpayer. See 454 U.S. at 480 n.17.
98 104,S. Ct. 1387 (1984). See text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
99 410 U.S. 113, 127-28 (1973).
100 Id. at 128.
101 On Duke Power, see text accompanying notes 180-84 infra. In Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1 (1982), the plaintiffs claimed that the Army's allegedly unconstitutional domestic
surveillance program had chilled first amendment rights. The plaintiffs appeared to be
within the zone of interests protected by the consitutional provision relied upon, and the
alleged injury was direct and immediate. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that such allegations of subjective "chill" were insufficient to support standing. It distinguished other
cases in which first amendment violations had been found on the basis of alleged chilling
effects, id.at 11, though recognizing that in an appropriate case, allegations of chilling
effect could state a judicially cognizable injury, id.at 12, 13. Perhaps the result in Laird is
best explained in terms of the Court's doubts that the plaintiffs' rights had in fact been
chilled in any way and its perception that they were therefore attempting to litigate the
rights of third parties. See id.at 13 & n.7.
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right" in order to establish standing.10 2 Finally, this view has been
03
subjected to substantial scholarly criticism.'
While the test implicates the merits and thus may sometimes
present more difficulty than an unrefined "injury in fact" approach
to standing, the "zone" test does not require that the Court resolve
the merits of the claim. Rather, it must only be able to say that the
plaintiff possesses some arguable claim of personal legal right. Such
inquiries are commonplace in the law governing the jurisdiction of
federal courts. 10 4 The objection that merits consideration should
be resolved on motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is wide
of the mark. The matter could be resolved in that way, but so long
as the plaintiff is clearly relying solely on the legally protected interests of others, a dismissal for lack of "standing" appropriately symbolizes the inappropriateness of his attempt to invoke the power of
the court.
The doctrines of reviewability and political question do not adequately serve the purpose of the zone test: they are focused on
whether an issue is subject to judicial review at all. The legal interest question, however, addresses the question of who may appropriately assert an otherwise justiciable and reviewable claim in court.
This question lies at the core of concern of the standing doctrine.
The current Supreme Court has clearly and, in my view, appropriately, rejected the view that so long as a claim is justiciable and
reviewable in a suit by one arguably possessing a claim of legal entitlement, it is equally justiciable and reviewable at the instance of
102 See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)
("The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different.").
103 See 4 K. DAviS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 24:17 (2d ed. 1983). Professor Kenneth Davis argues that the "zone of interests" test is artificial and unworkable, is inconsistent with the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act, is applied by the Court
only rarely and inconsistently, and has not in fact played a significant role in the Court's
standing decisions. He also argues that the test would preclude the courts from affording
common law protection to new rights. This argument ignores, however, the fact that the
test requires only that the plaintiffs injury be "arguably" within the scope of a viable legal
interest of the plaintiff-in short, that the claimed new right not be "frivolous."
Professor Davis' interpretation of the APA has not proved persuasive, and his characterization of the zone test as "artificial" is largely pejorative. Professor Davis' most serious
objection to incorporating consideration of the nature of plaintiffs claim into standing
analysis is that it is inconsistent with what the Court has actually done. However, a broad
review of the Court's decisions does not support his position. Not only has the Burger
Court repeatedly stated that the nature of the plaintiffs claim is an important-albeit "prudential"-aspect of standing doctrine, but as illustrated by its "injury" decisions, it has
acted in ways which are best explained on that ground.
104 See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (pendent jurisdiction); Bell v. Hood, 437 U.S. 678, 681-83 (1946) (original jurisidiction); Lambert Run Coal
Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 383 (1922) (removal jurisdiction); see generally
13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3564,
3567.1 (1984); 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3722 (1985).
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one who clearly has no personal claim to the protection of the law.
In the Court's view, that approach would sanction unwarranted intrusions into the legislative and executive spheres of federal and
state governments. 10 5 So long as those who do possess an arguable
claim of legal entitlement are permitted to invoke the judicial process, the role of the judiciary as a guarantor of individual rights
stands unimpaired.
B.

Zone of Interests

Incorporating consideration of the nature of plaintiff's claim
into standing analysis would be subject to serious objection if it
were inconsistent with what the Court has actually done. A review
of the Court's decisions dealing with the role of legally protected
interests and the assertion of third party rights is therefore
essential.
The "zone of interests" formulation derives from the Court's
1970 decisions in Association of Data ProcessingService Organization,Inc.
v. Camp,10 6 and Barlow v. Collins.10 7 In Data Processing, the question
before the Court was whether the sellers of data processing services
had standing to challenge the Comptroller of Currency's authorization to national banks to offer competing services. In Barlow, the
question was whether tenant farmers had standing to challenge a
regulation of the Secretary of Agriculture permitting the assignment of crop support payments as security for the payment of their
rent. In each case, the court of appeals had denied standing on the
ground that plaintiffs asserted no "legal right" or "legally protected interest" of their own. The significance of the Supreme
Court's opinions was in the rejection of the "legal interest" test for
standing on the ground that it unduly implicated the merits. "The
question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the 'case'
or 'controversy' test, the question whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question."' 0 8 The Court's opinion referred to both
prudential and article III aspects of standing, but did not clearly
identify the "zone of interests" test as only of "prudential" concern. The opinions also focused heavily on the language of the Administrative Procedure Act, which in section 702 provides for
judicial review in favor of any person "aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute," but appeared to regard
105
106
107
108

See text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
397 U.S. 159 (1970).
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
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this language merely as illustrative of the general "zone of interests" principle applicable to standing questions generally.1 0 9
Since Data Processing and Barlow, the Court has continued to
treat the "zone of interests" requirement as an essential, albeit
"prudential," part of the standing inquiry. In the Court's elaborate
rearticulation of its standing decisions in Warth v. Seldin, it observed
that:
[T]he source of the plaintiff's claim to relief assumes critical importance with respect to the prudential rules of standing that,
apart from Art. III's minimum requirements, serve to limit the
role of the courts in resolving public disputes. Essentially, the
standing question in such cases is whether the constitutional or
statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to
judicial relief.110
This view has been consistently repeated in decisions since
Warth.111 For reasons previously stated, the "zone of interests" is a
principled constitutional basis on which to limit the class of plain12
tiffs entitled to invoke judicial review.
109

Id.; Barlow, 397 U.S. at 165. In Data Processing, the Court also relied heavily on its

prior decision in Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), which held that a
competitor had standing to challenge TVA activities allegedly in violation of the TVA Act
because it was "within the class of persons that the statutory provision was designed to
protect." Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 155.
Justices Brennan and White concurred in the result in both cases, but dissented from
the Court's treatment of the standing question. They claimed that the only constitutional
requirement for standing was injury in fact and that the additional zone of interests requirement imposed by the majority was wholly nonconstitutional. In addition, the dissenters
contended that by imposing this additional requirement, "the Court comes close to perpetuating the discredited "legally protected interests theory." 397 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the result and dissenting). They believed that the question of statutory coverage should be considered when determining reviewability of the challenged agency action, not standing. Id. at 169. They recognized, however, that the question of
"reviewability" was separate from the merits, and that Congress may have precluded judicial review not only generally, but also with respect to a specific class of plaintiffs. Id. at 169
n.2, 173-74. But if the presumption was in favor of "reviewability" of agency action by any
person aggrieved, there must be a "persuasive reason" to conclude that Congress intended
to deny it. Id. The suggested distinction between standing and reviewability has not
proved influential in the Court's standing decisions.
110 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
111 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. American United For Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75
(1982); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 n.2 (1977).
112 In their influential treatise, Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper do not unequivocally reject the "zone" test, but suggest that "its reach remains obscure to lower courts."
13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.7
(1984). They suggest further that "[i]f the test is to become a predictable part of standing
doctrine, it will be necessary to define its purpose and its limits." Id. While their conclusion that the test is difficult to apply is justified, the test's purposes seem apparent. The
treatise itself recognizes that the test not only helps to ensure effective and concrete presentation, but also limits "the occasions for judicial action to circumstances of the greatest
need." Id. at 513.
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An approach to standing which focuses on the nature of the
claim asserted by the plaintiff, rather than on "injury in fact," is
obviously not a panacea. In some settings, those appropriately
viewed as within the protective intent of the legal entitlement asserted will be obvious. In others, the question may be of considerable difficulty. For example, determining the standing of persons
injured by congressional enactments allegedly in excess of the enumerated powers, or by administrative action allegedly in excess of
delegated authority, will continue to present perplexing problems.
Nonetheless, such problems are not insuperable. Thus, the historic
tendency of the Supreme Court to limit the class of injured persons
entitled to challenge official action allegedly in excess of lawful authority to those subject to direct regulatory requirements or alleging injury to an interest analogous to those traditionally protected
by the common law would no doubt continue under the approach
suggested here. 113 In the absence of a more specific indication of
broader protective intent, interpretation of a general limitation on
governmental authority to permit standing in those suffering previously unactionable forms of injury would constitute an unwarranted
extension of the judicial role. Similarly, difficulties in determining
the appropriate depth of judicial analysis for ascertaining when a
plaintiff is "arguably" within the protective intent of the legal entidement asserted should not prove unmanageable, 114 bearing in
mind that adjudication of the lawsuit on the merits is not an appropriate part of standing analysis.

Another difficulty for the thesis suggested here arises from the
Court's treatment of the zone of interests test as wholly "prudential." To the extent that this characterization is simply directed to
preserving a broad congressional role to designate private attorneys general authorized to sue in the public interest, it is entirely
consistent with the view that article III itself contemplates invocation of the judicial process only by those whose own rights have
been invaded, and not by interested bystanders or the public at
large. In fact, the Court's statutory standing cases tend to underscore the importance of the zone of interests requirement. On the
whole, they display a strong tendency to require that the "injury in
fact" sufficient to establish standing be closely related to the statutory intent, even when the statutory language would sustain the rec113 See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGath, 341 U.S. 123, 139-41 (1951)
(opinion of Burton, J.), 151-52 159-60 (opinion of Franfurter, J.); Perkins v. Lukins Steel
Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125-29 (1940); Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 407 U.S.
125, 143-44 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1938); Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 318-22 (1936).
114 For an excellent analysis of this question, see Judge Wilkey's opinion in Tax Analysts
& Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 137-45 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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ognition of a private right of action in favor of any person in fact
injured by the defendant's conduct. 115 The only plausible explanation for the Court's adoption of this approach is a recognition that
the "zone of interests" test is basic and fundamental, rather than
merely a judicial rule of prudence and self restraint.
16
The leading decision contrary to this position is Duke Power
where ChiefJustice Burger's opinion for the Court limited the Flast
"nexus" test to taxpayer suits. The majority rejected the argument
that plaintiffs had no standing because their claim on the merits
bore no relation to their injuries. The "zone of interests" limitation was wholly "prudential." The Court declined to apply the test
in Duke Power on the theory that "[w]here a party champions his
own rights, and where the injury alleged is a concrete and particularized one which will be prevented or redressed by the relief re115 In cases under the APA and the Fair Housing Act, the Court has occasionally suggested that broad statutory private right-of-action provisions may create standing which
would not otherwise exist. But the Court has generally construed such provisions to extend
standing only to persons arguably sought to be protected by the statute in question at least
absent an unmistakable declaration of congressional intent to confer standing on any citizen. The "zone of interests" test arose in cases under the APA, notwithstanding the ambiguity of the language of that statute. The Court has shown no signs of departing from that
construction in spite of protests that "injury in fact" is the only statutory and constitutional
requirement. See, e.g. 4 K. DAvis, ADMINisTRAnvE LAw TREATISE § 24:17 (2d ed. 1983).
The Housing Act cases reach the same result. The injury of persons accorded standing
in such decisions as Trafficante and Gladstone, the denial of the benefits of living in an integrated community, was not simply an incidental injury to a bystander having no relationship to the statutory purpose. Although the private right-of-action provisions of the Act
speak broadly of any "person aggrieved" by actions in violation of the Act, the injuries
recognized by the Court were closely connected to the statutory purposes. Similarly, in
Havens Realty, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), the Court held that black testers who had suffered the
type of misrepresentation injury prohibited by the statute had standing, but a white tester
equally offended by defendant's practices but who had not been directly injured himself
lacked standing. The injury to the organizational plaintiff in Havens Realty-impairment of
its housing counseling and referral services-was likewise closely related to the statutory
purpose.

That is not to say that the Court's decisions are wholly consistent. In Gladstone, the
Village of Bellwood was held to have standing on the apparent ground that defendant's
alleged steering practices were creating a segregated community, and this might impair the
city's tax base. 441 U.S. at 110-12. But the Court also recognized that "other harms flowing from the realities of a racially segregated community are not unlikely," such as the
inability to provide a desegregated education. Id. at 111.
Such leading "public interest" standing cases as Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) and Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) are consistent with the
analysis suggested here because of their focus on the protective intent of the statutory provisions relied upon. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940) might be viewd as inconsistent, as it allowed a competing radio station to appeal
the grant of a broadcast license even though it was not within the protective intent of the
agency's organic statute. However, the Court's decision rested squarely on its conclusion
that the competitor was included in the "person aggrieved" language of the appeals statute.
Id. at 476-77.
116 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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quested, the basic practical and prudential concerns underlying the
standing doctrine are generally satisfied when the constitutional
requisites are met."1 17 But the very objection to standing in Duke
Power was that the plaintiffs were not asserting their own rights, but
those of some as-yet unidentified class of victims of a nuclear accident which had not yet occurred and might never occur. The
Court's rationale for departure from the zone of interests or
"nexus" limitation was thus wholly unsatisfactory. Justices Stewart
18
and Stevens dissented on precisely this ground.'
While Duke Power demonstrates that the Court has not always
adhered to a nexus or interest requirement as central to the purposes of article III, it stands as a warning of the consequences of
not doing so.' 1 9 Perhaps the result in Duke Power could have been
avoided if Warth had not so clearly cast the zone of interests and
third party standing doctrines in wholly prudential terms relating to
effective advocacy, but instead had recognized their underlying separation of powers and federalism foundation, derived from the
Constitution itself.
Characterizing a standing limitation as prudential means that
the Court is free to depart from it when it believes it is appropriate
to do so. To the extent that such departures are frequent and not
explicable on grounds consistent with the constitutional foundation
for the limitation suggested here, my thesis should be rejected. It
is, therefore, imperative to examine closely the occasions on which
the Court has recognized the standing of persons whose own "legal
rights" have not arguably been invaded.
III. Assertion of "Third Party Rights"
A. Third Party Standing Generally
The view that a party is entitled to invoke the process of a federal court only if arguably within the zone of interests sought to be
protected by the right asserted logically implies that interested
third party bystanders are not entitled to assert the rights of others.
Since Warth v. Seldin, the Burger Court's decisions have emphasized
this point.' 20 Like the Court's "zone of interests" test, the Court
has viewed this restriction on standing as "prudential" and thus
121
subject to exceptions in appropriate cases.
This view is not an innovation, but draws support from a
117 Id. at 80-81.
118 See note 74 supra.
119 For a strong criticism of the decisions on somewhat differing grounds, see Varat,
VatiabkJusticiabilityand the Duke Power Case, 58 TEx. L. REV. 273 (1980).
120 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-95 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 113-18 (1976).
121 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 193-94.
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number of the Court's prior decisions over a substantial period of
time. The leading examples are well known.' 22 Although a number
122 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court permitted private
school corporations to assert that a state statute requiring parents and guardians to send
children under age 16 to public school unconstitutionally interfered with the liberty of the
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of their children. The interest of the
schools in preventing unlawful interference with their patrons and destruction of their business was viewed as "clear and immediate." Id at 536. In Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44
(1943), in contrast, the Court held that a physician had no standing to attack a Connecticut
statute prohibiting him from giving professional advice concerning contraceptives to his
patients. Id. at 46. The physician had challenged the statute only as a denial of the due
process rights of the patients.
In Barrows v.Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), however, the Court sustained the right of a
white seller of land to defend a suit for damages against him, predicated on his violation of
a racially restrictive covenant, by raising the fourteenth amendment rights of his black purchaser. The Court recognized that ordinarily a person had no standing to litigate the rights
of a third party because of the case or controversy requirement and the Court's complementary rule of self-restraint. Id. at 255. The Court allowed third party standing in Barrows, however, because it would be difficult or impossible for the parties whose rights were
asserted to present their claims before the court. Id. at 257. Additionally, the Court found
that the seller was the only effective litigant because of the close relationship among the
coercion exerted on the seller, her possible pecuniary loss, and the purpose of the restrictive convenant. Id. at 259. ChiefJustice Vinson strongly objected to the majority's characterization of the rule against third party standing as one of self restraint. Id. at 266 (Vinson,
C.J., dissenting).
In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court sustained the right of the
NAACP to assert its members' first and fourteenth amendment associational rights in opposition to a discovery order in a suit against the NAACP requiring the disclosure of membership records. The Court upheld the Association's standing to assert the rights of its
members, because the Association acted as the members' representative, the Association
and its members were identical in a practical sense, and the Association's membership
might have been adversely affected by the discovery order. Id. at 458-60.
In United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), the Court refused to permit state officials to defend an action by the Attorney General in that the statute under which the Attorney General proceeded might be unconstitutional if applied to the actions of private
persons. Justice Brennan, for the Court, observed that the exercise of judicial review is
limited by two rules: never decide a question of constitutional law before it must be decided, and never establish a rule of constitutional law broader than required by the precise
facts of the case. Id. at 21. Further, one to whom application of a statute is constitutional
cannot attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional as applied to other
persons or other situtations. Id. This rule frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations of statutes in
areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy." Id. at 22. Justice Brennan
distinguished Raines and cases such as Barrows and NAACP. Id. at 22-23.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court again considered whether
persons prosecuted for giving medical advice regarding contraception to married persons
had standing to raise the "rights of the married people with whom they have a professional
relationship." Id. at 481. The defendants were the Executive Director and the Medical
Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. The Court concluded that
"certainly the accessory should have standing to assert that the offense which he is charged
with assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally be a crime." Id. The Court distinguished
Tileston on the ground that plaintiffs in that case had sought a declaratory judgment for
which the requirements of standing should be strict. Id.
Finally, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), the Court allowed
a white assignor of membership rights in a discriminatory private club to raise the rights of
his black assignee in seeking injunctive relief against his expulsion from the club. The
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of themes were visible in the leading pre-1970 third party standing
cases, no coherent theory had emerged. In some, but not all of
these cases, the Court characterized the rule against permitting one
party to assert the "rights" of another as prudential. The reasons
which the Court gave for departing from the rule seemed to vary
from case to case. In some cases, the Court emphasized its concern
that the right in question might be impaired if third party standing
were not recognized. In others, the nature of the relationship between the party asserting the right and the person whose right was
asserted was clearly important. In others, the Court focused on the
possible inability of the absent party to assert his or her own rights.
Yet in others, the posture of the party asserting the right as a plaintiff or defendant apparently influenced the result.
On the whole, the Burger Court's decisions on third party
standing are typical of its justiciability decisions generally. They do
not depart radically from prior doctrine. Instead, the Court has attempted to articulate the principal elements of its approach with
more precision, and on occasion to provide a somewhat more
highly developed rationale for its approach.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird123 the "seven-man" Court of the early
Nixon years 24 considered the conviction of Baird, who was neither
a physician nor a licensed pharmacist, for distributing contraceptive
foam. Under Massachusetts law, the distribution of contraceptive
materials to unmarried persons was forbidden. In addition, only
licensed physicians and registered pharmacists could distribute
contraceptives to married persons, and then only with a prescription. The record contained no evidence regarding the marital status of the recipient. Justice Brennan, writing for four members of
the Court, rejected the argument that Baird had no standing to
challenge the statute as violative of the fourteenth amendment
rights of single persons, advanced on the theory that Baird was not
an authorized distributor. He reasoned that there could be "no
question" of Baird's standing under article III of the Constitution
because he was a criminal defendant. 125 Justice Brennan concluded
that the rules of third party standing should be relaxed in Eisenstadt,
even assuming that the restriction on distributors was a valid health
measure. The decision rested largely on the perceived "impact of
the litigaton on the third-party interests."' 26 Enforcement of the
Court reasoned that "[s]uch a sanction would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial

restrictions on property." Id. at 237. Under Barrows, there could be "no question" regarding Sullivan's standing. Id.
123 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
124 Justices Powell and Rehnquist had been appointed but did not participate.
125 405 U.S. at 443.
126 Id. at 445.
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statute would "materially impair the ability of single persons to obtain contraceptives," since they were not subject to prosecution and
1 27
thus were denied a forum in which to assert their rights.
The absence of a doctor-patient or aiding and abetting relationship was not critical to the Court in Eisenstadt. It was sufficient
that the relationship between Baird and his potential distributees
was "that between an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain
contraceptives and those desirous of doing so. The very point of
Baird's giving away the vaginal foam was to challenge the Massa-

2
chusetts statute that limited access to contraceptives."1 8
Eisenstadt appears to be out of step with the overall tone of the
Burger Court's justiciability decisions. The Court has repeatedly
rejected the concept that an "advocacy" relationship may give rise
to standing for the purpose of asserting legal rights. It is true that
the Court stated that the relationship was not critical, and that the
primary determinant of standing was the alleged inability of unmarried persons to assert their own rights. But it seems unlikely that an
appropriate declaratory judgment action could not have been maintained by a single person denied contraceptives, or by a licensed
distributor suing to remedy the injury to his business. Moreover,
the Court's facile assumption that Baird had suffered article III injury as a result of the challenged statute, even assuming that the
restriction on distributors was valid as a health measure, is illogical.
There was no evidence of the status of Baird's distributee, and if
the restriction on distributors was valid without regard to the marital status of the distributee, there was no principled basis on which
Baird's injury could be traced to the alleged illegality complained
of. Even if the restriction on distribution to unmarried persons was
invalid, Baird's conduct could be validly prohibited.
It is tempting to dismiss Eisenstadt as an aberrational decision
of the early seven-man Court, with little or no continuing precedential force. But there may be more to it than this. The Court's assumption that Baird possessed article III standing without regard
to the nature of the rights he was asserting or the relationship of his
claim of illegality to the validity of his conviction may have been the
result, in part, of its characterization of the third party standing rule
as entirely "prudential." The Court's "prudential" approach to
third party standing may also have contributed to its suggestion
that an "advocacy" relationship might be sufficient to permit one
127 Id. at 446. Justices White and Blackmun concurred in the result on the ground that
the restriction on distributors had not been adequately supported as a health measure. Id.
at 463-64. ChiefJustice Burger dissented on the ground that the only question before the
Court was the validity of the restriction on distributors, and that restriction should be sustained as a valid health measure. Id. at 465-72.
128 Id. at 445.
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party to assert the rights of another. These possibilities will be discussed further below.
After Eisenstadt, the Court's third party standing decisions followed a more predictable course. In Doe v. Bolton, the Court sustained the standing of physicians to challenge allegedly
unconstitutional state restrictions on abortion on the ground that
the statutes operated direcdy against them and the doctors should
not have to await criminal prosecution in order to determine their
validity.' 29 In Warth v. Seldin, the Court underscored its conviction
that the third party standing and zone of interest rules are "prudential," and recognized that "contervailing considerations" might in
some cases outweigh this bar.130 The Court then proceeded to apply the "prudential" third party standing rule to bar suit by Rochester taxpayers who alleged that their tax burden had been increased
by the need to provide additional housing for low income people
allegedly excluded from residence in a neighboring community by
its restrictive zoning practices, but who had not asserted any personal constitutional or statutory rights.' 3 ' The Court distinguished
such cases as Doe v. Bolton because: the challenged zoning restrictions were not being enforced against the plaintiffs and did not "adversely affect a relationship existing between them and the persons
whose rights assertedly are violated," and the taxpayer plaintiffs
had not shown that their prosecution of the suit was necessary to
32
protect the asserted rights.'
In PlannedParenthoodv. Danforth,'33 the Court upheld the standing of physicians who performed and supervised abortions to challenge the parental and spousal consent provisions of Missouri's
abortion statute on the ground that the provisions violated the
rights of both physicians and their patients. Because the statute operated directly against the plaintiffs, they had asserted "a suffiand should not be
ciently direct threat of personal detriment"
34
prosecution.
criminal
a
await
required to
129 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973). The Court expressly refused to determine whether similar
claims by nurses, clergymen, social workers, and nonprofit corporations advocating abortion were justiciable, but it noted that they were "another step removed and as to them, the
Georgia statutes operate less directly." Id. at 189. Such persons were, however, liable to be
prosecuted as accessories or conspirators. Id.
130 422 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1975). In a footnote, the Court observed that similar standing issues arose when a litigant asserted the rights of third persons defensively as a bar to a
judgment aginst him, and that in such cases "there is no Art. III standing problem; but the
prudential question is governed by considerations closely related to the question whether a
person in the litigant's position would have a right of action on the claim." Id. at 500 n.12.
131 Id. at 508.
132 Id. at 510.
133 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
134 Id. at 62.
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In Singleton v. Wulff,'3 5 however, the Court had more difficulty
upholding the standing of physicians to challenge a state statute
excluding abortions not "medically indicated" from Medicaid payments. Justice Blackmun, writing for four members of the Court, 13 6
found standing on the ground that the exclusion from Medicaid
benefits constituted sufficient "injury in fact" for article III purposes. As to whether the doctors could assert the rights of their
patients, the Court stated that the federal courts should "hesitate"
before recognizing third party standing, because they "should not
adjudicate such rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the
holders of those rights either do not wish to assert them, or will be
37
able to enjoy them regardless of whether the suit succeeds."'
Moreover, "third parties themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own rights."' 38 However, when the relationship between the litigant and the person whose rights are assserted is such
that "the enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the
activity the litigant wishes to pursue, the court at least can be sure
that its construction of the right is not unnecessary in the sense that
the right's enjoyment will be unaffected by the outcome of the
suit."'

39

Even if there is a close relationship, a party should nor-

mally be required to assert his own rights. However, "[i]f there is
some genuine obstacle to such assertion

. . .

, the party who is in

court becomes by default the right's best available proponent."' 140
These principles required recognition of standing in Singleton
because a woman could not safely secure an abortion without the
aid of a physician, and "[tihe woman's exercise of her right to an
abortion.

. .

is therefore necessarily at stake here."'

41

In addition,

the physician was uniquely qualified to litigate the claim. Both the
woman's desire to protect her privacy and the possibility of mootness presented "obstacles" to the woman's assertion of her own
rights that, while not insurmountable, were sufficient to sustain the
doctor's standing.' 42
135 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
136 Justice Blackmun could not obtain a majority. Justice Stevens concurred only on the
ground that the physicians had asserted that their own constitutional rights were violated.
That being true, he believed that they also had standing to assert the rights of their patients. Id. at 121-22.
137 Id. at 113-14.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 116. Moreover, "third parties themselves usually will be the best proponents
of their own rights," and as courts depend on effective advocacy, they "should prefer to
construe legal rights only when the most effective advocates of those rights are before
them." Id. at 114.
141 Id. at 117.
142 Id. at 117-18. Responding to Justice Powell's assertion in dissent that Doe v. Bolton
and similar decisions recognizing physician standing turned on the "direct interdiction" of
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Justice Powell, joined by the ChiefJustice and Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist, dissented in part. He agreed that the plaintiffs possessed article III standing because of their alleged monetary injury,
yet stated that there was an additional inquiry, a matter of judicial
self-governance, of "whether it is prudent to proceed to decision
on particular issues even at the instance of a party whose Article III
standing is clear." 143 Reviewing the Court's prior decisions, Justice
Powell concluded that third party standing had been sustained only
where statutes "directly interdicted" a physician-patient relationship by criminalizing it44 or where it was effectively impossible for
the party whose rights were in question to assert them himself. 145
In Singleton, there was no "direct interdiction" and the mere assetion of "obstacles" to the third party's direct assertion of rights was
insufficient. 146
The Court's view that an actual or potential criminal defendant
normally has standing to assert the rights of third parties intimately
involved in the prohibited transaction proved controlling in its subsequent decisions in Craigv. Boren,147 and Carey v. PopulationServices
International.148 In Craig, the Court sustained the standing of a licensed beer distributor to challenge Oklahoma's prohibition on the
distribution of beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to
females under the age of eighteen on the ground that it denied
equal protection to males. The Court again concluded that article
III standing requirements were met by the potential "injury in fact"
resulting from enforcement of the statute against the distributor. 149
As to nonconstitutional limitations on third party standing, dismissal of the action would unnecessarily foster repetitive litigation and
would serve no purpose, as the issues had been effectively
presented. 150 Since Eisenstadt and similar decisions established that
a vendor was entitled to assert the rights of purchasers who would
be adversely affected if the statute were enforced and since the statute in question directly regulated the vendor, he was the "obvious
the physician patient relationship by the criminalization of certain procedures, Justice
Blackmun pointed out that many of the Court's prior third party standing decisions, such as
Pierce, see note 122 supra, upheld standing absent any such "direct interdiction," while
others such as McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), had denied standing to a criminal defendant to assert the rights of third persons. Id. at 118 n.7.
143 Id. at 123-24 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144 Id. at 129.
145 Id. at 125-26.
146 Id. at 126.
147 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
148 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
149 429 U.S. at 194. The claim of a male plaintiff had become moot when he reached
age 21 during the pendency of the appeal. Id. at 193.
150 Id. at 193-94.
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claimant."''
Similarly, in Carey, the Court relied on Eisenstadt and
Craigin concluding that an unlicensed distributor of contraceptives
had standing to challenge a New York statute limiting the distribution of contraceptives, as a violation of the rights of both the dis152
tributor and its purchasers.
As with the Court's injury decisions generally, the Burger
Court's doctrinal approach to third party standing leaves a number
of points of difficulty unresolved. At the most basic level, for example, the Court has based its conclusion that the rule against third
party standing is "prudential" on evaluation of cases in which the
"rights" of another were asserted by a criminal defendant. In that
context, the Court has insisted that the defendant clearly has suffered article III "injury in fact" from the mere maintenance of the
15
action against him. 3
This contention, however, is subject to question. Assume, for
example, a case such as United States v. Raines,154 in which the allegedly invalid portion of a statute is severable from the remaining
provisions which apply to the conduct of the defendant. Whether
the issue is raised by a civil or criminal defendant, a determination
of unconstitutionality would have no effect on the validity of ajudgment. Thus, the injury of which the defendant complains-the imposition of criminal punishment-is causally unrelated to the legal
challenge he has raised. In what sense can such a defendant be said
to have article III standing? Under the principles consistently espoused by the Burger Court, article III standing should be denied
on the ground that the defendant's alleged injury cannot be traced
to the alleged violation.' 55
On what basis, then, are cases in which civil and criminal defendants do have standing to raise the "rights" of others to be distinguished from those in which they do not? Is the question wholly
one of the inseverability of the statute's application to the defendant from its application to third parties? And if this is the basis for
recognizing third party standing, in what sense can the defendant
be said to be raising the rights of others rather than those of
himself?
The differences in the significance accorded to the various factors bearing on third party standing in Singleton v. Wulf are equally
151 Id. at 196-97. Only ChiefJustice Burger dissented on the standing issue. Id. at 215.
152 431 U.S. at 683-84.
153 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976).
154 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
155 See part V infra. This is not to say that such a defendant does not have standing to
litigate the issue of severability itself. But once that issue is resolved adversely to the defendant, there is no basis on which to accord the defendant standing to challenge his own
conviction on the basis of the claim that the severable portions of the statute may be invalid
as applied to others.
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puzzling. Justice Blackmun, writing for four members of the Court,
attached great importance to the relationship between the parties
as bearing not only on the effectiveness of advocacy of the right
asserted, but on whether it was necessary and appropriate for the
Court to entertain the challenge at all.1 56 On the other hand, he
concluded that a substantial obstacle to the assertion of rights by
their possessors would be sufficient to permit a third party to assert
them. 157 In contrast, Justice Powell for four other members of the
Court downplayed the significance of the relationship between the
parties, which he viewed as bearing only on the question of adequate presentation of the rights asserted. Rather, the critical factors were whether it was "impossible" for the party whose rights
were asserted to vindicate them directly, or whether a state enforcement program "directly interfered" with the enjoyment of the right
in question. 58
Uncertainty in treatment of the factors bearing on third party
standing continues unabated after more than fifty years of judicial
consideration. Perhaps the Court's lack of unanimity is symptomatic of a defect in the doctrinal underpinnings of its approach.
The Court has stated that the prudential standing rule is "closely
related" to article III concerns. If so, there is a need to define this
relationship and to determine when it is appropriate to depart from
the general rule.
To the extent that the Court has attempted to explain its rule
of "self-restraint," it has done so in language containing decidedly
constitutional overtones. In Warth v. Seldin, for example, the Court
emphasized that absent such a rule, the courts would be called on
to resolve "abstract questions of wide public significance.

. .

even

though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights."'' 59 Similarly, in Singleton v. Wulff,160 Justice Blackmun
explained the rule against third party standing primarily on the
ground that courts should not adjudicate rights unnecessarily, or
where their holders do not wish to assert them, or where the litigation is irrelevant to their enjoyment.16 ' These "prudential" concerns do not differ significantly from those implicit in a
construction of article III. As the Burger Court has held, the article
III inquiry looks not simply to whether an issue is sharply presented
in a form capable ofjudicial resolution, but equally to whether the
resolution of such a right is "necessary," since the Court has a con156 428 U.S. at 113-18 (plurality opinion).
157 Id. at 116.
158 Id. at 126-29 & n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
159

422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).

160 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
161

Id. at 113-16.
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stitutional duty to decide only cases or controversies properly
brought before it.
A view of standing which assumes that, under article III of the
Constitution, rights should normally be asserted only by those arguably within the "zone of interests" which the constitutional or
statutory guarantee asserted seeks to protect would do much to rationalize the Court's third party standing decisions. Consider, for
example, the Court's relatively persistent, if not wholly consistent,
emphasis on the relationship of the party asserting the right in question to the party whose "rights" are asserted. Where such a relationship is absent-as in the case of the taxpayers denied standing
to assert the rights of persons allegedly adversely affected by discriminatory zoning ordinances in Warth-the Court has denied
standing. But the Court has almost uniformly recognized standing
where a doctor-patient or seller-buyer relationship is present and
where the person asserting the right is in the position of an actual
or potential civil or criminal defendant. In such cases, the relationship itself manifests the intention of the possessor of the right to assert it, and
the relationship of the parties is such that permitting enforcement
would have the inescapable effect of impairing the ability of the
"holder" of the right to enjoy it. To say that relaxation of the general prohibition against third party standing in such circumstances
is "prudential" is artificial. To put the matter another way, would
the Court have denied standing to the white seller asserting the
rights of his black purchaser in Barrows v. Jackson, or to the doctors
made criminal defendants in Griswold v. Connecticut and Doe v. Bolton
if Congress had passed a statute purporting to deny them standing
to assert the constitutional rights of their patients? Given the
Court's conclusion that recognition of third party standing was essential to permit effective vindication of the constitutional right, the
answer is at least doubtful. In such cases, to use the words of Warth
v. Seldin itself, the Court had "found, in effect, that the constitutional . . . provision in question implies a right of action in the
plaintiff." 16 2 Surely Congress does not have unlimited power to restrict the assertion of such a constitutionally based right.
The same general line of analysis would help to explain the
apparently different treatment accorded third party standing questions where plaintiffs rather than defendants seek to assert the
"rights" of others. Where the plaintiff is not the object of actual or
immediately threatened enforcement, it is, as Justice Blackmun
pointed out in Singleton v. Wulif, far less clear that the right is truly
threatened, or that the "holder" of the right wishes to assert it.
Both the relationship of the parties and the existence of apparent
162 422 U.S. at 501.
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obstacles to asserting the right by its direct beneficiary serve to ensure that litigation is not unnecessarily foisted on the Court by an
interested bystander. On the other hand, to insist that assertion of
the right by its direct beneficiary be shown to be "impossible," as
suggested by Justice Powell in Singleton, goes well beyond prior authority without any principled basis of support in article III. Such a
draconian additional "prudential" standing requirement should
therefore be rejected.
Just as increased recognition of the article III basis of zone of
interests considerations in standing doctrine would have avoided
aberrant decisions such as the Duke Power case, so in the area of
third party standing, it would decrease the likelihood of results such
as Eisenstadt. It is true that the relationship between the parties in
Eisenstadt evidenced the intention of the woman given contraceptives to assert her right to obtain them, and that resolution of the
claim of right was not unnecessary because Baird was a criminal
defendant. But it seems equally true that if the limitation on distribution was a valid health measure, neither Baird nor his distributee
had standing to challenge the restriction on distribution to single
persons unless that provision could be shown to be inseverable
from the statute as a whole. In Eisenstadt, therefore, standing
should have been denied unless Justice Brennan had been willing
to invalidate explicitly the restriction on authorized distributors of
contraceptives. The characterization of third party standing doctrine as "prudential" no doubt contributed to the Court's willingness to recognize standing in Eisenstadt despite serious article III
difficulties. Conversely, increased focus on the separation of powers aspects of article III as the basis for the general rule against
third party standing would protect the Court from charges that it
has "manipulated" standing rules to exclude disfavored claims on
an unprincipled basis.
If followed by the Court, the suggested analysis could have altered the result in its most recent decision on third-party standing,
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.163 In Shutts, the Court permitted a

class action defendant to assert that it would be a violation of due
process for a state court to exercise jurisdiction over members of a
plaintiff class who did not have "minimum contacts" with the forum
state. The Court recognized that defendant arguably lacked standing to assert the rights of class members under the approach of Singleton v. Wulif, but sustained standing on the ground that defendant
was vindicating its "own interests" in assuring that any judgment
entered would bind the class members as well as itself. Under the
view advanced here, however, the Court should have permitted the
163

105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985).
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defendant to raise the minimum contacts question only if it possessed, not simply an "interest," but arguable claim of legal entitlement to a judgment binding the members of the class under the
due process clause or some other constitutional provision, statute,
or rule of court.
B.

First Amendment Overbreadth

Those who resist a "zone of interests" approach to standing
find comfort in the Burger Court decisions which continue to apply
the first amendment "overbreadth" doctrine. This doctrine permits persons whose first amendment rights are not violated to challenge application of a statute to them on the ground that it would
violate the first amendment rights of others. These decisions on
their face support the view that "injury in fact" is the only constitutional aspect of standing doctrine. Moreover, because they permit
parties whose own rights are not at stake to assert the "rights" of
unrelated third parties without any evidence that the rights of these
persons are truly threatened or that they wish to assert them, such
decisions suggest that the separation of powers and related federalism underpinnings for standing doctrine advanced here are of little
concern.
If the Burger Court had enthusiastically embraced the overbreadth doctrine and applied it expansively in non-first amendment
areas, this position would be unassailable. That, however, has not
been the case. The Court has substantially curbed the doctrine
even in the first amendment area, essentially on separation of powers grounds, and has shown no inclination to expand its coverage.
Careful examination of the Court's decisions supports the conclusion that the overbreadth doctrine is the exception which proves
the rule.
In its early application of the overbreadth analysis in Coates v.
City of Cincinnati,164 the Court applied conventional Warren Court
doctrine in reversing a conviction under an ordinance precluding
sidewalk assembly in a manner "annoying" to passers-by without
regard to the details of the defendant's conduct. The opinion
hardly stands as a ringing endorsement of overbreadth analysis.
The majority emphasized that the ordinance "is vague, not in the
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the
sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all."' 165 Thus, the
rights of Coates himself were arguably at stake. Moreover, four
members of the Court dissented on the ground that in order to
164
165

402 U.S. 611 (1971).
Id. at 614.
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assess a vagueness challenge, it was necessary to know the conduct
16 6
with which the defendant was charged.
In Gooding v. Wilson,' 67 the Court confronted a "pure speech"
case involving offensive words addressed to a police officer.168 The
language in question apparently fell within the category of "fighting
words" which, under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,' 69 could be constitutionally prohibited. Nonetheless, the Court invalidated the
conviction on overbreadth grounds. Regardless of whether appellant's conduct could be validly prohibited, the statute must be invalidated on its face unless it was "not susceptible" of invalid
application to others, because of the possibility of inhibiting protected expression. 170 Because the statute was not, in the majority's
view, narrowly drawn to reach only "fighting words," appellant's
conviction was invalid. Focusing on federalism concerns, ChiefJustice Burger's dissent anticipated future developments. He argued
that procedures for facial invalidation of state criminal statutes were
"'fundamentally at odds with the function of the federal courts in
our constitutional plan.' "171 At the very least, "substantial" overbreadth should be demonstrated before facial invalidation was
72
appropriate.'
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,' 7 3 the Court narrowly confined overbreadth scrutiny, holding that Oklahoma's "little Hatch Act" regulating political activity by public employees should not be subjected
to overbreadth scrutiny: the fact that the statute might be applied
to protected expression such as the wearing of political buttons was
irrelevant.174 Appellants had been charged with clearly unprotected activity.' 7 5 The majority's rationale was based on the same
fundamental concerns of properly restricted judicial power that underlie its standing doctrine generally. The Court expressed the
"conviction that under our constitutional system courts are not roy166 Id. at 617 (opinion of Black, J.); id. at 618 (White, J., dissenting).
167 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
168 The defendant allegedly addressed the officer with "White son of a bitch, I'll kill
you" and "[y]ou son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death." Id. at 519 n.1. The Georgia statute
involved prohibited the use "to or of another, and in his presence. . . opprobrious words
or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace." Id. at 519.
169 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in Gooding.
ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Blackmun dissented.
170 Id. at 521.
171 Id. at 531 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52-53
(1971)). As the Court had observed in Younger, the power ofjudicial review, "broad as it is,
does not amount to an unlimited power to survey the statute books and pass judgment on
laws before the courts are called upon to enforce them." 401 U.S. at 52.
172 405 U.S. at 530.
173 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Justice White authored the majority opinion for himself, the
ChiefJustice, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun.
174 Id. at 608-10.
175 Id at 619-20.
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ing commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the
Nation's laws;" thus, "constitutional rights' are personal and may
not be asserted vicariously." 176 Although the first amendment
overbreadth doctrine was a limited exception, the Court's overbreadth cases had been limited to cases involving spoken words or
where rights of association were "ensnared" in overbroad statutes,
and cases involving regulation of time, place and manner of communication or involving discretionary prior restraints. 77 Further,
overbreadth claims, "if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied
to protected conduct."' 7 8 The Court stated that "particularly
where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that
the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial
as well judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." 1 79 Under this standard, the Oklahoma statute passed
180
muster.
In Lewis v. City of New Orleans,18 1 a six-to-three majority of the
Court reverted to the expansive approach of Gooding v. Wilson and
invalidated a New Orleans ordinance which made it unlawful for
any person "wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city
police while in the actual performance of his duty."' 182 The Court
then articulated a more restrictive approach in Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 83 which involved a facial challenge to an ordinance
prohibiting drive-ins from showing films containing nudity when
the screen was visible from a public street or place. Justice Powell's
176 Id.at610-11.
177 Id. at 612-13. The Court stated that the overbreadth doctrine was "strong
medicine" that has been applied "sparingly and only as a last resort." Id. at 613.
178 Id. at 613.
179 Id. at 615.
180 Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion asserted that the majority's "speech-conduct"
distinction was unsupported by prior authority and effectively overruled Coates. Id. at 622.
He criticized the majority for not defining "substantial overbreadth," and for not offering a
rationale for its distinction between deterrence of conduct and deterrence of speech, both
equally protected by the first amendment. Id. at 630-31. He noted that "in the case before
us it is hard to know whether the protected activity falling within the Act should be considered speech or conduct." Id. at 631. His opinion was joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall. Justice Douglas dissented separately.
181 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
182 Id. at 132. Justice Blackmun, joined by the ChiefJustice and Justice Rehnquist, dissented on the ground that the Court was "not merely applying constitutional limitations,
. . .but [is] invalidating state statutes in whole sale lots because they 'conceivably might
apply to others who might utter other words.'" Id. at 137 (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 537 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). "The more frequent our intervention,
which of late has been unrestrained, the more we usurp the prerogative of democratic government. Instead of applying constitutional limitations, we do become a 'council of revision.'" Id. at 140.
183 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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majority opinion concluded that the ordinance was invalid as applied to the appellant, but went on to address the question whether
the ordinance should be invalidated on its face. The Court held
that "a state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it
is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts
• . . and its deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real
and substantial."18 4 Under this standard, the majority concluded
that the statute was facially invalid.
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,15 in contrast, the Court
rejected a vagueness challenge to a zoning ordinance restricting the
density of "regulated uses," including adult theatres, in specified
areas. Justice Stevens for a five-member majority held that the ordinance was not vague as applied, and that there was no occasion to
consider its vagueness in other applications. The majority concluded that the zoning ordinance was subject to a narrowing construction and would not have a significant deterrent effect on
protected activity.' 8 6 Accordingly, under the Erznoznik standard, facial invalidation was inappropriate. In requiring demonstration of
a "significant" deterrent effect, the Court did not rely on the fact
that "conduct" was regulated, as in Broadrick, but on the fact that
the speech regulated was, in the majority's view at least, "on the
87
borderline between pornography and artistic expression."'
88
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' the Court further restricted
application of overbreadth analysis by holding that it does not apply to "commercial speech." Although commercial speech was entitled to first amendment protection, "the justification for the
application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the
ordinary commercial context," because commercial speech was unlikely to be deterred. 189
The Court continued to waver on the overbreadth issue in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,190 in which it
invalidated an ordinance prohibiting solicitation of contributions
by organizations that did not use at least seventy-five percent of
their receipts for charitable purposes. Even though commercial solicitation might concededly be regulated to prevent consumer
184 Id. at 216 (emphasis added). "[W]hen considering a facial challenge, it is necessary
to proceed with caution and restraint, as invalidation may result in unnecessary interference
with a state regulatory program." Id.
185

427 U.S. 50 (1976).

186 Id. at 60-61.
187 Id. at 61. Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, asserting that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and that its deterrent effect was
just as significant as that leading to facial invalidation in Erznoznik. Id. at 94-96 & 95 n.7.
188 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
189 Id. at 380.
190 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
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fraud, religious and charitable solicitation raised a variety of speech
interests protected by the first amendment. 191 As applied to charitable solicitations, the seventy-five percent limitation could not
stand. Whether plaintiff was engaged in charitable or commercial
solicitation was irrelevant, because, under conventional overbreadth doctrine, the ordinance was invalid if it was not narrowly
drawn to exclude protected speech, whether or not the conduct of
the party before the court was protected. 192 Although "conduct"
was obviously involved, the Court did not mention Broadrick's "substantial" overbreadth doctrine, nor the availability of a readily ap193
parent narrowing construction, so important in Young.
The Burger Court's general skepticism regarding overbreadth
analysis reemerged in New York v. Ferber.194 At issue was a New
York statute prohibiting knowing promotion of sexual performances by children under sixteen by distributing material depicting
them. The Supreme Court applied the "substantial" overbreadth
doctrine of Broadrick, stating that its rationale applied fully in a case
involving "the harmful employment of children to make sexually
explicit materials for distribution."'' 95 While a sweeping statute
might have the potential for chilling expressive activities by many
persons, "the extent of deterrence of protected speech can be expected to decrease with the declining reach of the regulation."1 96
In Ferber, the Court doubted that the arguably impermissible applications of the statute amounted
to more than a "tiny fraction" of
97
the materials within its reach.
Putting aside the obvious internal inconsistencies of the Burger
Court's "substantial overbreadth" cases, several things are clear.
Wide-ranging application of the doctrine evidenced by such cases
as Coates and Gooding has been substantially curtailed. So long as
allegedly "marginal" speech, or some form of "conduct" is involved, the Court is likely to require "substantial" overbreadth as a
condition of facial invalidation. Although, as Erznoznik suggests,
such cases occasionally occur, the usual result of the Court's new
doctrine will be to require the litigant before the Court to demonstrate that the challenged statute or ordinance is unconstitutional
"as applied." As with so much of its justiciability doctrine, the
Court has justified this curbing of overbreadth analysis primarily in
191 Id. at 628, 632-33.
192 Id. at 633-35.
193 See text accompanying notes 184-86 supra.
194 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
195 Id. at 771.
196 Id. at 772. "This observation appears equally applicable to the publication of books
and films as it is to activities, such as picketing or participation in election campaigns, which
have previously been categorized as involving conduct plus speech." Id.
197 Id. at 773.
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terms relating to the properly limited role of the federal judiciary in
a representative democracy.
The Burger Court's restrictive approach to overbreadth analysis is more consistent with prior overbreadth cases than such extreme applications as Gooding v. Wilson. In most of the foundation
"overbreadth" decisions prior to 1970, the rights of the party
before the Court had been violated, and the invalid sweep of the
challenged statute was substantial.19 8 Facial invalidation in such
circumstances is a far less substantial invasion of state and federal
legislative and executive spheres than in cases such as Gooding, in
which the invalid sweep of the statute was ephemeral, and the conduct of the party before the Court was almost certainly not
protected.
The consistency of the Court's new doctrine leaves much to be
desired. Presumably because of its view that "pure speech" cases
involve very limited governmental interests, and because it is reluctant to repudiate overbreadth doctrine entirely, the Court has purported to preserve expansive overbreadth analysis in such cases.
But the distinction between speech and conduct is at best illusive.
All speech to some extent involves conduct. If the speech-conduct
distinction makes any sense at all, surely the "conduct" which invokes the "substantial" overbreadth doctrine must be something
more than the act of communication itself. Yet in cases such as
Broadrick and Ferber, the identification of such additional "conduct"
is difficult and strained. Ferber involved the sale of films-a core
speech activity-while Broadrick involved political solicitations and
button wearing. These were "conduct" cases. In contrast, the
charitable solicitations involved in Village of Schaumburg were apparently analyzed under the expansive overbreadth doctrine applicable
to "pure speech."
It is equally unclear on what basis courts may be expected to
make the essentially empirical determination whether a statute is
"substantially" overbroad. Such judgments are made without any
concrete demonstration of the range of the statute's application.
By their very nature, they require speculative determinations of a
kind contrary to the essential role of the judiciary described in the
Burger Court's decisions. Moreover, the Court has not made clear
whether such unsubstantiated predictions are to be made on a qualitative or quantitative basis, or some combination of the two.
198 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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These observations might suggest that if the Court were true
to its principles, it would reject overbreadth analysis altogether.
The question remains, however, whether its retention of the doctrine in modified form should be viewed as a rejection of a view of
justiciability which seeks to limit the judiciary to a role consistent
with the separation of powers and federalism postulates of the Constitution. I suggest that it should not. An appropriately limited judicial role should not preclude a court from vindicating individual
rights where it is clear that such rights are being violated in a significant number of cases, that holders of the rights are not indifferent,
and that they will be unable to assert them under conventional doctrine. If the Court were able to say with confidence-if not with
certainty-that these conditions were met, then its essential role as
a guarantor of individual rights would require a departure from
normal standing principles.
The Burger Court's restriction of overbreadth analysis represents an effort to address these concerns. As a generalization,
where conduct is involved and overbreadth is insubstantial, or
where a narrowing construction is readily apparent, the Court recognizes not only increased likelihood of unnecessary interference
with legitimate law enforcement and other activities of the representative branches of federal and state governments, but also considerably less basis for predicting that important speech and
associational interests will be irreparably impaired. But the "conduct" standard is only a conclusory generalization. The important
question is not whether speech or conduct is involved, per se, but
whether important protected speech is likely to be deterred in a
significant number of cases and whether those who are deterred are
unlikely to assert their rights in court. Similarly, the Court's focus
on the type of speech involved in such cases as Young and Ferber
underscores its reluctance to depart from conventional standing
principles unless it is convinced that important first amendment
values are truly at stake.
No matter what verbal formulation the Court employs, its effort to predict cases in which the rights of those not before the
court are truly and irreparably threatened is inherently uncertain.
As previously suggested, one conclusion which could be drawn is
that the attempt should not be made.1 9 9 The Burger Court has not
endorsed this view. However, the uncertainty of such predictions
suggests that overbreadth analysis should be employed cautiously,
and only when the Court has considerable confidence in its conclu199 This is particularly true in light of the broad availability of modem declaratory judgment procedure permitting those whose rights are threatened to vindicate them without the
risk of criminal penalty.
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sion. This is the approach that the Court has taken. The fact that
an exercise ofjudgment is required does not mean that the Court's
approach to overbreadth analysis is "prudential." In justiciability
determinations, as in other areas, constitutional analysis frequently
requires difficult judgmental determinations. The Burger Court's
wavering but painstaking approach to the overbreadth doctrine
confirms the constitutional underpinnings of its justiciability doctrine generally, and of the requirement that a party assert an arguable claim of personal right in particular.
IV. Representational Standing
Representational standing raises essentially the same concerns
as those discussed relative to third party standing. The question is
when one person is entitled to invoke the judicial process to determine the "rights" of others. The issue arises in the contexts of organizational standing and class action standing. In each of these
areas, the considerations already explored help to provide a more
unified and principled explanation for the approach which the Burger Court has taken.
A.

OrganizationalStanding

Despite forceful scholarly support for a contrary position, the
Burger Court has rejected the concept that an advocacy interest of
the type possessed by a public interest organization provides a basis
for invoking the process of an article III court. 200 The contrary position is based on the view that the public interest plaintiff may be in
as good or better a position than the traditional plaintiff to present
a case with sufficient "concrete adverseness" to permit informed
judicial resolution. 20 ' The Court's lack of enthusiasm for this approach is best viewed in terms of separation of powers and federalism, rather than as turning solely on whether ideological plaintiffs
are generally capable of presenting a case in a form suitable for
judicial resolution.
The Court has not rejected organizational standing altogether.
The most comprehensive statement of its approach is that in Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission.20 2 In sustaining the
standing of the Washington Commission to raise a commerce
clause challenge to North Carolina's restriction on the display of
Washington apple grades, the Court reviewed its prior decisions
and concluded:
200
201
tions:
202

See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
For an influential statement of this view, see Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in PublicAcThe Non-Hohfeldian or IdeologicalPlaintff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1037-38 (1968).
432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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[W]e have recognized that an association has standing to bring
suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit.203
The limitation that the presence of individual members of the
organization be unnecessary to determination of the claim asserted
or the relief sought is clearly focused on the article III requirement
that a case be presented with concrete adverseness in a form suitable for judicial resolution. 20 4 The other aspects of the Court's organizational standing doctrine focus on separation of powers and
federalism concerns designed to preserve an appropriate role for
the representative branches of federal and state governments. If an
organization is to be accorded standing to assert the rights of its
members, then the courts must be able to conclude with reasonable
certainty not only that it is able to do so effectively, but also that it is
not a volunteer, and that its presence in court very probably reflects
the decision of the "holder" of the right to assert it. These considerations are not merely prudential, but go to the heart of the limited role of the judicial branch in our system of government. The
organizational standing doctrine elaborated in Hunt reflects the
Court's conclusion that where the organization in question takes on
the character of a trade association or other voluntary organization
whose very reason for being is to implement the wishes of its members, and where the suit before the Court advances interests which
are "germane to the organization's purpose," there is sufficient assurance that the organization's members wish to invoke the judicial
20 5
process.
203

Id. at 343. Professor Tushnet has suggested that this approach to organizational

standing is inconsistent with the Court's general insistence on the presence of a traditional
plaintiff, and recognizes in effect the standing of public interest or ideological plaintiffs in
these limited circumstances. See generally Tushnet, The Sociology of Artice III: A Response to
ProfessorBrilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980). This view overlooks the significance of
the limitations imposed by the Court.
204 The Court has little sympathy with the idea that an organizational plaintiff will adequately present questions turning wholly on the individual circumstances of each of its
members. In the Court's view the necessity for individualized proof of such damages for
each member requires their participation as parties. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515-16
(1975). On the other hand, the organization might obtain declaratory and injunctive relief
in an appropriate case, because it "can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted,
will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured." Id. at 515.
Such relief was nonjusticiable in Warth, however, because the organizational plaintiffs had
shown no specific project that was currently being precluded by the defendants' conduct.
Id. at 516-17. See the discussion of the remoteness aspect of the justiciability doctrine, infra
at notes 304, 307.
205 See 432 U.S. at 343. Although the organization in Hunt was established by statute
and was supported by compulsory assessments, the Court concluded that "for all practical
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The same analysis largely explains the apparent tension between the Court's third party standing decisions, which require a
plaintiff to show some disability or obstacle to the direct assertion
of the right by its holder, and the organizational standing decisions,
which do not. Where the standing of the third party plaintiff is
based merely upon some business relationship with the person
whose "rights" are asserted, such as that of a doctor and patient or
buyer and seller, the failure of that person to evoke the judicial process may reflect the fact that the rights are not truly threatened, or
are not important to their possessor. A showing of some disability
or obstacle to the direct assertion of the rights thus provides some
additional assurance that the judicial process has not been invoked
unnecessarily. On the other hand, where a voluntary organization
asserts rights of its members that are closely related to its organizational purpose, the assumption that the members of the organization wish to obtain judicial relief is justified without any additional
showing of disability.
B.

Class Actions

The Burger Court has held that the claim of the representative
party in a class action must bejusticiable not only when the action is
filed, but at the time of class certification. 20 6 Thus, mootness of the
named representative's claim prior to class certification requires
dismissal of the action-unless the matter is "capable of repetition
yet evading review," but mootness of the named plaintiffs claims
following class certification will not result in dismissal of the action
so long as a live controversy with the class remains, and representation is adequate. 20 7 This doctrine raises a number of questions: If
a named representative with ajusticiable claim for relief is unnecessary after class certification, why not before? If a named representative with a live claim is necessary before certification, why not
after? And apart from these questions, is not the existence of the
entire class action procedure, which by definition permits the court
to resolve the rights of those not before the court even though they
have not asserted them, inconsistent with the separation of powers
view of justiciability suggested here?
As discussed in more detail below, 20 8 the class action mootness
purposes [it] performs the functions of a traditional trade association representing the
Washington apple industry." Id. at 344. The Court made essentially the same point in
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), when it observed that "[p]etitioner is the appropriate party to assert these rights, because it and its members are in every practical sense
identical. The Association... is but the medium through which its individual members
seek to make more effective the expression of their own views." Id. at 459.
206 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402-03 & n. 11 (1975).
207 Id.
208 See text accompanying notes 332-43 infra.
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doctrine simply recognizes the legislative determination embedded
in Rule 23 that in cases of shared common grievances falling within
the categories of Rule 23, it is appropriate for a court to determine
the rights of those who have not asserted them. The Rule 23 requirements of typicality, commonality, and adequate representation209 ensure that the claims of the class will be presented
concretely and effectively-in short, that the matter is suitable for
judicial resolution. As to the separation of powers and federalism
underpinnings ofjusticiablity doctrine, Rule 23 itself represents a
legislative recognition of appropriateness of a broader role for the
courts.

2 10

In this light, the Court's insistence that a named representative
with a live claim be before the court at all times before class certification, but not after, becomes more comprehensible. Prior to certification, there is no legislative authorization for the Court to
entertain and determine the rights of class members who have not
asserted them. After certification, the rule itself authorizes the
Court to put aside normal separation of powers and federalism concerns and to determine the rights of the absentees without their
consent.
V.

Causation and "Redressability"

Whether the "injury" component of the justiciability doctrine
is viewed primarily as a means of assuring that issues are presented
with concrete adverseness, or as a means of ensuring that the power
of judicial review be invoked only in cases of actual necessity, it is
clear that there must be some basis on which the plaintiff's injury
can be linked to the challenged conduct of the defendant. Recognition of standing on the basis of injuries which are unrelated to the
defendant's conduct would be as gratuitous and illogical as recognition of standing in the absence of any injury at all.
One of the most notable aspects of the Burger Court's justiciability decisions has been its clear recognition of and adherence
to this principle. Because the limitation seems so obvious when
stated in general terms (unless one rejects the "injury" component
of the standing doctrine altogether), 211 it is surprising that the
Court's particularization of the requirement would generate controversy. Nonetheless, of all of the justiciability decisions of the
Burger Court, those dealing with the issues of causation and
"redressability" have generated the most strident accusations that
209 See General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1981).
210 The Rule was approved by the Supreme Court itself, but this was pursuant to power
validly delegated by the Rules Enabling Act, and subject to the disapproval of Congress.
211 See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 201; Tushnet, supra note 203.
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the Court has manipulated the standing doctrine to serve its unar212
ticulated substantive agenda.
The concepts of causation and redressability emerged in Linda
R. S. v. RichardD.213 The mother of an illegitimate child challenged
a Texas criminal statute imposing support obligations on the parents of legitimate, but not those of illegitimate, children as a denial
of equal protection. The complaint alleged that the father of the
child had refused to provide support, and that the district attorney
had refused to prosecute. 21 4 Justice Marshall and four other members of the Court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing, since
she "failed to allege a sufficient nexus between her injury and the
government action which she attacks to justify judicial intervention." 215 The plaintiff had been injured by the failure of support,
but she had not shown direct injury "as the result" of the defend21 6
ant's failure to prosecute.
In the SCRAP case, decided the same term, however, the Court
reached a superficially inconsistent result. It sustained the standing
of an unincorporated environmental organization to challenge implementation of a freight rate increase on the ground that it would
discourage the use of recyclable materials, thus impairing its members' recreational and aesthetic interests in the use and enjoyment
of the Washington, D.C. area. 217 After concluding that standing
could properly be based on aesthetic and environmental injury as
well as economic injury, and that Sierra Club was distinguishable be212 See, e.g., Nichol, Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use ofJudicialRestraint, 69 Ky. LJ. 185 (1980).
213 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
214 Id. at 616.
215 Id. at 617-18.
216 Id. at 618. "[I]f appellant were granted the requested relief, it would result only in
the jailing of the child's father. The prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future,
result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative." Id, Having reached
this seemingly dispositive, if questionable, conclusion, the majority then somewhat curiously observed that "the Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither
prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. . . .[These cases] demonstrate that in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks ajudicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Id. at 619 (emphasis added).
Justice White, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented, stating that "I had always thought
our civilization has assumed that the threat of penal sanctions had something more than a
'speculative' effect on a person's conduct," an assumption apparently shared by the state of
Texas which "assumes that criminal sanctions are useful in coercing fathers to fulfill their
support obligations to their legitimate children." Id. at 621. Justices Blackmun and Brennan would have remanded the case for reconsideration in light of an intervening decision,
Gamez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), but expressed the view that the standing issue was "a
difficult one with constitutional overtones." Id. at 622.
217 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 678 (1973). The challenge was based on the claim that no environmental impact
statement had accompanied the Commission's decision, as allegedly required by the NEPA.
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cause SCRAP had alleged injury to its members, 21 8 the Court
turned to the question of causation. It noted that the injury to the
environment alleged in SCRAP was "far less direct and perceptible"
and involved a far more. attenuated line of causation than that in
Sierra Club. 21 9 Nonetheless, a unanimous Court sustained standing.
Even though pleadings must be something more than "an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable," the plaintiffs had alleged specific harm that distinguished them from other citizens,
and it was impossible to say that their allegations could not be
2 20
proved.
Together, these decisions created the appearance of judicial
manipulation. A relatively obvious chain of causation was ignored
in Linda R. S. v. Richard D. in closing the court to a mother seeking
support for an illegitimate child, while an admittedly remote and
attenuated chain of causation was recognized in SCRAP in order to
reach and reject an environmental challenge on the merits. This
impression was reinforced by the Court's next decision on the causation issue, Warth v. Seldin. The low and moderate income plaintiffs in Warth alleged that they desired to obtain suitable housing in
the town of Penfield, but had been unable to do so because of the
town's restrictive zoning ordinances, which had precluded the construction of housing that was within their financial means. Each of
the individual plaintiffs alleged that he desired to reside in Penfield,
and that he had made unsuccessful efforts to locate housing that he
could afford. 2 21 Justice Powell, for a five-member majority, concluded that such allegations were insufficient. The Court was willing to assume that defendants' actions had contributed
substantially to the cost of housing in Penfield. Nonetheless:
[T]here remains the question whether petitioners' inability to
locate suitable housing in Penfield reasonably can be said to
have resulted, in any concretely demonstrable way, from respondents' alleged constitutional and statutory infractions. Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could be
inferred that, absent the respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is substantial probability that they would have been
able to purchase or lease in Penfield and that, if the court affords the relief requested,
the asserted inability of petitioners
2 22
will be removed.
The plaintiffs asserted that their injuries resulted from enforcement of the zoning ordinance against third parties, which allegedly
218 Id. at 686-87.
219 Id. at 688.
220 Id. at 688-90. On the merits, the Court concluded that the district court had no
jurisdiction to enter the requested injunction. Id. at 689-90.
221 422 U.S. 490, at 503-05 & n.14 (1975).
222 Id. at 505.
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precluded the constructon of suitable housing. While the indirect
nature of plaintiffs' harm was not in itself fatal to standing, "it may
make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. III: to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was
the consequence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective re2 23
lief will remove the harm."

Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion foreshadowed the recurrent theme of later academic critics of the Burger Court's causation
decisions. He argued that the majority's result "can be explained
only by an indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits."

224

In effect, the Court tells the Low-income minority and building
company plaintiffs they will not be permitted to prove what they
have alleged-that they could and would build and live in the
town if changes were made in the zoning ordinance and its application-because they have not succeeded in breaching,
before the suit
was filed, the very barriers which are the subject
22 5
of the suit.
The majority's result was inconsistent with decisions such as

SCRAP, which had "not required such unachievable specificity." 226
The Court's somewhat tendentious application of the causation requirement continued in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization,227 in which indigents attempted to challenge an
IRS ruling that permitted hospitals to obtain tax treatment as charitable organizations despite their refusal to provide nonemergency

treatment to those unable to pay. Each of the individual plaintiffs
alleged one or more occasions on which they or members of their
family had been unable to obtain needed hospital services because
of their indigency. 2 28 The Court held that the indigent plaintiffs
223 Id. at 505. Plaintiffs' ability to live in Penfield depended on the efforts of third parties, and the record showed only two previous efforts to build low and moderate income
housing. The record did not indicate that either of these projects would have satisfied the
plaintiffs' needs at prices they could afford. Id. at 505-06. The plaintiffs' inability to live in
Penfield was a "consequence of the economics of the area housing market" rather than of
the challenged zoning practices. Id. at 506. The Court found no indication that the petitioners could afford housing in the proposed projects and, therefore, "the facts alleged
fail[ed] to support an actionable causal relationship between Penfield's zoning practices
and petitioners' asserted injury." Id. at 506-07. In contrast to lower courts recognizing
standing where the plaintiffs challenged zoning restrictions as applied to projects they
could afford and of which they were intended residents, the Court found that the petitioners here relied on an unsubstantiated and remote possiblity that they may have been better
off if the respondents had acted differently. Id. at 507.
224 Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 523. Justice Brennan stated that "this is not the sort of demonstration that can
or should be required of petitioners at this preliminary stage." Id. at 526. Further, they
could not be expected to know the future plans of developers and the precise details of the
Penfield housing market in advance of discovery. Id- at 527-28.
226 Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
228 Id. at 32-33.
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lacked standing because they had not established that the revenue
ruling was the "cause" of their inability to obtain hospital services,
or that invalidation of the ruling would make such services available
to them. In the Court's view, it was "speculative" whether the denials of services resulted from the tax ruling or from decisions of the
hospitals made without regard to their tax status. Linda R. S. and
229
Warth were controlling.
Causation analysis proved no barrier to standing in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation.230
The Court sustained the standing both of a developer and an individual plaintiff to challenge the refusal of the Village of Arlington
Heights to rezone a parcel to permit multiple-family construction.
There was "little doubt" that the developer had standing, because
it had been refused permission to build a specific project that it had
contracted to place on a specific site. 23

If injunctive relief were

granted, that barrier would be removed. It did not matter that the
project still might fail because of an inability to obtain financing or
for some other reason: "a court is not required to engage in undue
speculation [about such uncertainties] as a predicate to finding that
the plaintiff has the requisite stake in the outcome." 23 2 In addition,
one individual plaintiff had alleged that "he seeks and would qualify
for the housing MHDC wants to build in Arlington Heights." 233
This was held not to be a "generalized grievance" because it "focuses on a particular project and is not dependent on speculation
23 4
about the possible actions of third parties not before the court."
In Bryant v. Yellin, 23 5 the Court reverted to expansive treatment
229 The Supreme Court declined to reach the Secretary's contention that IRS policies
could not be challenged by third parties whose own tax liabilities were unaffected. Id. at 37.
However, Justice Stewart, concurring on the standing issue, additionally observed that "I
cannot now imagine a case, at least outside the First Amendment area, where a person
whose own tax liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax
liability of someone else." Id. at 46.
Justice Brennan concluded that the case was not ripe because it was not clear how, if at
all, the challenged ruling applied to the hospitals that had denied services to the plaintiffs.
Id. at 52-55 (Brennan, J., concurring). In his view, however, the Court's standing analysis
was deficient. The plaintiffis alleged claim of injury was not the denial of treatment per se,
but the denial of the benefit of the economic inducement to provide indigents treatment
which the revenue ruling had removed. Id. at 56. He believed that the line of causation in
Simon was clearly less attenuated than that recognized in SCRAP as a sufficient basis for
standing. Id. at 62-63.
230 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
231 Id. at 261.
232 Id. at 261-62.
233 Id. at 265. At trial he testified that if the project were built, he would probably move
to it because it was closer to hisjob. This was sufficient to establish his standing because "if
a court grants the relief he seeks, there is at least a 'substantial probability' . . . that the
Lincoln Green project will materialize." Id. (citations omitted).
234 Id. On the merits, the Court held that there was no fourteenth amendment violation.
235 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
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of the causation requirement, reminiscent of the result in SCRAP.
The United States sought a declaratory judgment that a statutory
provision limiting water deliveries from federal reclamation
projects to not more than 160 acres under single ownership applied
to all lands in the Imperial Valley. After an adverse judgment, the
United States determined not to appeal. A number of Imperial Valley residents then sought to intervene for the purpose of taking an
appeal. They based their standing on the contention that they
wished to purchase Imperial Valley lands, and that if the 160-acre
limitation were applied, a provision of federal law requiring recipients of reclamation waters to sell their excess land at a price not
including the value of irrigation rights if they were to continue to
receive water would force the sale of Imperial Valley land at prices
the plaintiffs could afford. Without careful analysis, the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that
the intervenors had standing. That Court had reasoned that while
no owner was forced to sell, it was highly unlikely that existing owners would prefer to withdraw land from production. Thus, respondents had standing under Arlington Heights, even though they could
not establish with certainty that they would be able to purchase the
23 6
excess lands.
Bryant is consistent with the "zone of interests" approach to
standing doctrine suggested here, for the 160-acre limitation was
designed to protect and enhance the viability of the small family
farm. On the other hand, its "causation" analysis is more problematic. Bryant is obviously inconsistent with Warth. Unlike the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights, the proposed intervenors had not
established that if the 160-acre limitation were applied, a specific
parcel of land which they wished to purchase would become available at a price they could afford. Thus, their claim of injury as a
result of the 160-acre limitation was subject to multiple future contingencies. The Court nonetheless proceeded to reject application
of the 160-acre limitation on the merits. Bryant thus suggests that
the Court may have manipulated the causation requirement with a
view to the merits. On the other hand, only the standing of intervenors was at stake. It is not clear whether intervenors are required
to meet the same standing requirements as those who initiate an
action.23 7 Moreover, the Court clearly did not focus on the standing issue, which occupied only two paragraphs of the opinion.
236 Id. at 367-68. In a footnote, the Court concluded that absence of information about
the intervenors' financial resources was irrelevant, because if forced sales occurred, they
would be at prices far below the market and resale value of the property. Id. at 367 n.17.
237 See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1907, 1908
(1972) discussing the interest requirement of Rule 24(a). But see New Orleans Public Serv.,
Inc. v. United Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
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In Allen v. Wright,23 8 the parents of black children attending
public schools attempted to maintain a nationwide class action challenging the adequacy of IRS procedures to ensure the denial of tax
exemptions to racially discriminating private schools. The suit alleged that the improper grant of such exemptions harmed their
children's ability to obtain a desegregated education by aiding and
encouraging the expansion of segregated private schools. A fivemember majority of the Court held that the parents lacked standing. They had not alleged direct racial discrimination against their
children, but only indirect injury resulting from the existence and
growth of discriminating private schools. The Court stated that
"the line of causation between [the challenged IRS conduct] and
desegregation of respondents' schools is attenuated at best." 2 39
The separation of powers aspect of standing stood behind the
Court's refusal to find causation: "That conclusion would pave the
way generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies es240
tablish to carry out their legal obligations."
238 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
239 Id. at 3328. It was uncertain how many racially discriminatory private schools were
receiving tax exemptions, whether the withdrawal of tax exemptions would lead any particular school to change its policies, and whether any parent of a child attending private
school would transfer his child to public school resulting from the threatened loss of tax
exempt status. Id. at 3328-29. Thus, the chain of causation was "far too weak for the chain
as a whole to sustain respondents' standing." Id. at 3329.
240 Id. The Court attempted to distinguish its prior decision in Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455 (1973), in which the parents of public school children had been allowed to
challenge the state's provision of textbooks to students in racially discriminatory private
schools, on the ground that the plaintiffs in Norwood had been the beneficiaries of an outstanding school desegregation decree. Id. at 3331. Thus, they had a legally protected right
under the decree to preclude the state from perpetuating a racially discriminatory school
system. Id.
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the Court was again using"'standing to
slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration of their
claims on the merits.'" Id. at 3333 (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the result and dissenting)). In his view, the standing inquiry
focuses on the proper party to maintain the action, and does not in itself raise any
separation of powers concerns. Id. The majority's causation analysis ignored that
"[c]ommonsense alone would recognize that the elimination of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory private schools would serve to lessen the impact that those institutions
have in defeating efforts to desegregate the public schools." Id. at 3357. Norwood was, in
his view, indistinguishable. Id. at 3338-39.
Justice Stevens' dissent similarly rested on the view that the very purpose of tax exemptions was to promote the subsidized activity. Withdrawal of the exemption would therefore
discourage the activity and limit the availability of segregated private schools as an alternative to public schools, thus promoting the process of desegregation. Id. at 3343. Justice
Stevens criticized the majority's reliance on separation of powers considerations because
they provide no guidance in answering the only relevant inquiry-whether the injury alleged was fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant. Id. at 3345. He contended that
the standing inquiry should be focused on the party seeking to maintain the action, rather
than on whether the issues raised were justiciable. Id. at 3333-46.
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If the Burger Court's causation decisions are evaluated solely
on the rationale offered by the majority of an often narrowly divided Court, they are subject to criticism. Such cases as Warth, Simon, and Allen v. Wright appear to impose impossible pleading
requirements on the plaintiffs, and to require plaintiffs somehow to
prove or "establish" the validity of the chain of causation that they
have alleged without the benefit of any opportunity for discovery or
the presentation of evidence. Moreover, although the decisions are
phrased in terms of the inadequacy of plaintiff's "allegations" of
causation, there is no indication that the plaintiffs were to be accorded any opportunity to amend, or that there were any more detailed allegations that could have been made that would have
satisfied the Court. In short, the plaintiffs were precluded as a matter of law from establishing the chain of causation that they had
alleged. The Court offers no persuasive justification for erecting
such an impenetrable legal barrier to the assertion of rights.
Apart from the pleading aspect, the cases rely heavily on the
idea that it is "speculative" to assume that if the relief requested is
granted, the plaintiff will in fact obtain the desired benefit. Yet, as
others have pointed out, it has never been necessary to establish
with certainty that a desired benefit will be obtained in order to
permit a party seeking that benefit to maintain an action to remove
an illegal barrier to the opportunity to receive it.241 The Court itself
recognized this in Arlington Heights in which it sustained the standing of a developer and prospective tenant to challenge zoning restrictions precluding a project despite the fact that there was no
assurance that financing could be obtained or that the project
would be constructed absent the restrictions. The same was true in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, where the plaintiff was
permitted to challenge the constitutionality of a medical school's
use of a racial quota in admissions, even though there was no assurance that the plaintiff would be admitted if the quota were removed. 242 Moreover, it is difficult to answer the position of the
dissentingJustices that criminal statutes are assumed to restrain the
conduct prohibited, and that tax subsidies are granted for the very
purpose of promoting the subsidized conduct.
The conclusion that has generally been drawn from such decisions is that they are explicable only in terms of hostility to certain
241 See Nichol, supra note 212, at 209-11.
242 In a footnote of his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Powell
noted that the trial court found an injury in Bakke's not being allowed to compete for all
places in the class because of his race; thus, the article III requirements were met and "the
question of Bakke's admission vel non is merely one of relief." 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
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types of claims on the merits. 248 There is, however, reason to question this conclusion. For example, the Court upheld standing to
challenge zoning requirements in Arlington Heights, despite its prior
rejection of standing in Warth. The difference between the cases
was in the immediacy and concreteness of the impact of the regulation, not in the nature of the rights asserted. Moreover, if the
Court were hostile to certain types of claims on the merits, it is unlikely that it would cloak its hostility under the guise of standing,
thus generating additional litigation by others who might be in a
better position to advance the disfavored rights. If the Court were
truly hostile to certain assertions of right, one would expect it to
reach out to seize and dispose of such claims on the merits, rather
than to temporize on justiciability grounds-just as it apparently
ignored normal justiciability limitations when it reached out to decide a disfavored claim on the merits in Duke Power.
As previously argued, the Burger Court's justiciability decisions are frequently explainable on the basis of certain types
of merits considerations, such as whether the plaintiff is arguably
within the zone of interests protected by the constitutional or statutory guarantee asserted. While this view does make standing turn
on the merits to a limited extent, it cannot be criticized on the
ground that it permits the Court to "manipulate" the standing doctrine to reject disfavored rights. Rather, this view of standing is
value-neutral.
Such value-neutral merits considerations may have influenced
the results of the causation decisions. Most notably, Linda R. S. and
Allen v. Wright-and less obviously, Simon-all involved challenges
to law enforcement discretion, which is subject to the most narrowly circumscribed judicial review even by those who are the direct objects of enforcement. 24 4 The Court's opinion in Linda R. S.
explicitly emphasized this factor:
The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks
standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority
when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. . . [These cases] demonstrate that, in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. 2 45
Simon involved the additional consideration that recognition of
standing would have permitted one taxpayer, in effect, to challenge
the tax liability of another. Although the majority of the Court declined to reach this point in Simon, Justice Stewart's concurring
243

See generally Nichol, supra note 212.

244 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1656-57 (1985); United States v. Batcheider, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
245 Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (citations omitted).
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opinion specifically relied on it.246 The same issue was lurking in
the background in Allen v. Wright, but it was not decided by the
Court. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens observed: "the
Court could be saying that it will not treat as legally cognizable injuries that stem from administrative decisions concerning how enforcement resources will be allocated. This surely is an important
point." 247 He ultimately concluded that the issue regarding specific
constitutional and statutory limitations on the IRS's enforcement
discretion was not "so insubstantial that respondents' attempt to
raise it should be defeated for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on
the ground that it infringes the Executive's prerogatives," but
48
should be dealt with on the merits.2
If the question whether third parties had a legally cognizable
interest in constraining IRS enforcement discretion was not insubstantial, Justice Stevens was correct that it would not justify dismissal of the case for lack of standing to sue. Conversely, the negative
implication of his analysis is correct: If the majority of the Court
was of the view that third parties clearly have no legally cognizable
interest in controlling the service's enforcement discretion, then
the action was properly dismissed for lack of standing. The dismissal would be based on the general separation of powers principle
that one who possesses no arguable claim of legal entitlement may
not invoke the judicial process. As the majority did not address
that issue either in Simon or Allen v. Wright, we do not have the benefit of the Court's views on the question. At the very least, however,
the explicit grounding of its holding in Linda R. S. on the view that
third parties have no legally cognizable interest in controlling
prosecutorial discretion suggests that the tax cases may implicitly
recognize that third parties have no judicially cognizable interest in
challenging the tax liabilities of others, or the IRS's allocation of
enforcement resources. One should not assume that because the
reasons articulated by the Court do not provide a fully satisfactory
explanation for the results reached, it was motivated by hostility to
the underlying claims on the merits.
The analysis does little to explain the result in Warth v. Seldin.
Nonetheless, even in this setting there is reason to question
whether the Court was motivated by hostility to certain values.
Although the issues of "causation" and "redressability" may not
provide adequate justification for what the Court did, the result
seems generally consistent with the approach that the Court has
taken to another significant element of the justiciability doctrine246 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 36 & n.14 (1976); id. at 46
(Stewart, J., concurring).
247 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3347 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248 Id. at 3348.
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that the threat to the plaintiff's interest be demonstrated to be both
"real and immediate," rather than remote and hypothetical. In appraising Warth, it is therefore useful to examine the Burger Court's
ripeness decisions.
VI.

Ripeness

The Burger Court has emphasized that in order to present a
justiciable controversy, the plaintiff's threat of harm must be "real
and immediate," not abstract, speculative, or remote. 249 Such decisions have frequently insulated claims of unconstitutional patterns
of state and local law enforcement from anticipatory judicial review.
This development has once again produced close divisions on the
Court, and considerable scholarly criticism. As in other areas, a
brief chronological review of what the Court has done is helpful to
analysis.
Younger v. Harris250 concerned the circumstances in which a federal court might enjoin a pending state prosecution. Harris had already been indicted, but three other plaintiffs had not yet been
charged. Although those plaintiffs alleged that the prosecution of
Harris inhibited their own exercise of first amendment rights, the
Court held that the controversy was not justiciable. These plaintiffs
did not claim that prosecution was likely, or even a remote possibility. The Court indicated, however, that if the three had made such
allegations, a live controversy would exist should the district court
find them to be true. 251

The decision in Younger was not clearly couched in constitutional terms. In O'Shea v. Littleton,252 however, the Court held nonjusticiable a claim by residents of Cairo, Illinois, challenging
alleged unconstitutional conduct of a local judge and magistrate in
bond setting, sentencing, and jury fee assessment. The complaint
failed to allege that the named plaintiffs had been subjected to any
of the alleged unconstitutional practices, although, on oral argument, counsel represented that they had been. 253 Justice White, for
six members of the Court, held that plaintiffs had not alleged a sufficient threat of injury to themselves to present an article III controversy. Plaintiffs must allege an injury or threat of injury that is both
249 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
495-96 (1974).
250 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
251 Id. at 42.
252 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
253 Id. at 495. The unconstitutional conduct was allegedly in retaliation for economic
boycotts challenging racial discrimination in which the plaintiffs had participated. Id. at
491-92.
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"real and immediate," not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." 254
Even if the named plaintiffs had experienced illegal conduct in the
past, "past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a
present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief. . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present, adverse effects." 2 55

Although past wrongs were evidence bearing on whether there was
a real and immediate threat of future injury, there was no allegation
that plaintiffs would be improperly arrested or prosecuted in the
future. The Court "assume[d] that respondents will conduct their
activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as
well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct said to be
256
followed by petitioners."
In Steffel v. Thompson, 257 the Court held that a plaintiff who had
been threatened with arrest for the distribution of handbills at a
shopping center presented a justiciable controversy under the first
amendment. Petitioner alleged that he wished to return to the
shopping center to distribute handbills, but had not done so because of his fear of arrest. The parties stipulated that if he did so,
he would be arrested. 258 The controversy was justiciable under article III because, unlike the three plaintiffs in Younger, petitioner
had "alleged threats of prosecution that cannot be characterized as
'imaginary or speculative.' "259 Justiciability did not require that
260
the plaintiff actually be arrested or prosecuted.
The Court's unwillingness to find a justiciable controversy
where application of a challenged regulatory provision to the plaintiff rests on uncertain or multiple contingencies was strongly illustrated in its next treatment of the ripeness doctrine, in California
Bankers Association v. Shultz.261 Banks, bank customers, and associa254 Id. at 494.
255 Id. at 495-96.
256 Id. at 497. The majority observed that the considerations underlying its justiciability
analysis "shade into" those determining whether there is a sound basis for equitable relief.
Id. at 499. It cited Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), for the proposition that injunctions interfering with state criminal processes should be sparingly issued. The relief sought
would constitute nothing more than "an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings which would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v. Harris...
and related cases sought to prevent." Id. at 500 (citation omitted). Justice Douglas, for
himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall, -dissented on the ground that the complaint
alleged a real future threat that baseless charges would be filed against those participating
in the boycott. Id. at 505-12.
257 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
258 Id. at 456.
259 Id. at 459 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971)).
260 Id. Because of "the recent developments reducing the Nation's involvement in [Vietnam]," however the Court remanded the case to the trial court "to determine if subsequent
events have so altered petitioner's desire to engage in handbilling at the shopping center
that it can no longer be said that this case presents [a live controversy]." Id. at 460.
261 416 U.S. 21 (1974).

924 *
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tions representing their interests sought to challenge the recordkeeping and reporting requirements imposed by regulations
implementing the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. The Court held a variety of the claims nonjusticiable on ripeness grounds. The "claims
of depositors against the compulsion by lawful process of bank
records involving the depositors' own transactions must wait until
26 2
such process issues."
In the Regional Rail Reorganization Cases,2 6 3 the Court concluded
that a variety of constitutional challenges to the compulsory reorganization of eight major railroads by conveyance of their properties to Conrail were ripe for consideration. The district court had
determined that the taking claim was not ripe, relying on a number
of contingencies which remained before any coveyance would be
accomplished, including the formulation of a reorganization plan,
failure of either house of Congress to disapprove the plan, and the
issuance of an order of conveyance by a special court. 2 64 The
Supreme Court noted that "issues of ripeness involve, at least in
part, the existence of a live 'Case or Controversy' " under article
111.265 In the Court's view, "implementation of the Rail Act will
now lead inexorably to the final conveyance, although the exact
date of that conveyance cannot be presently determined." 2 66 The
statute conferred no discretion on the special court to refuse to order the conveyance to Conrail. "Where the inevitability of the operation
of a statute against certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the
existence of ajusticiable controversy that there will be26a7 time delay
before the disputed provisions will come into effect."
Id. at 51-52.
Similarly, the ACLU's first amendment challenge to recordkeeping and reporting requirements on the ground that they might disclose its members and contributors was not
ripe because "no such disclosure has been sought by the Government .... ." Id. at 56.
Fifth amendment challenges of individual depositors to domestic and foreign reporting requirements were also unripe, for even though the depositors alleged that they would engage in covered transactions, there were no allegations establishing that any of the
information required would tend to incriminate them. Id at 73.
In dissent, Justice Marshall impliedly challenged a number of the majority's ripeness
decisions, on the ground that the banks frequently voluntarily disclosed their records to the
government without the issuance of compulsory process, and the depositors would therefore have no meaningful opportunity to raise their claims at a later time. Id. at 96-99.
263 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
264 Id. at 138-40.
265 Id. at 138.
266 Id. at 140.
267 Id. at 143 (emphasis added). Nor were there any prudential factors which would
support delaying the resolution of the constitutional question until a time closer to conveyance. In particular, it was unlikely that the courts would have a better factual record on
which to decide the issues at any time of conveyance, and the conveyance once made, would
be practically irreversible. Id. at 145-46. The railroads also claimed that they would suffer
an "erosion taking" of their properties by forced unprofitable operation pending the conveyance to Conrail. Absent a determination of the availability of a Tucker Act remedy to
262
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Rizzo v. Goode268 involved yet another challenge to an alleged
pattern of discriminatory law enforcement by local authorities. The
suits alleged a pervasive pattern of unconstitutional mistreatment
of minority citizens by the Philadelphia police department. The
principal defendants were the mayor, the managing director, and
the police commissioner of the city, who were alleged to have inadequately supervised the police. The evidence established a number
of instances in which the constitutional rights of individual members of the plaintiff classes had been violated. 26 9 Justice Rehnquist,
for six Justices, expressed concern that the evidence established no
link between past constitutional violations and any policy or practice of the defendants and doubts whether there was an article III
case or controversy between the individual defendants and the
named plaintiffs. 270 As in O'Shea, the existence of a real and immediate threat of injury turned on speculation as to what would happen to the plaintiffs in the future. Here, however, the question was
even more conjectural than in O'Shea, because the question was not
what the defendants might do to the plaintiffs in the future, but
what "one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to
them in the future because of that unknown policeman's perception
271
of departmental disciplinary procedures."
The Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 272 illustrates the importance of congressional action in justiciability determinations. It
compensate for any unconstitutional erosion of the estate, there was "a distinct possibility"
that plaintiffs would suffer a taking without adequate assurance that compensation would
ever be provided. Id. at 124. The Court did, however, hold that issues of valuation theory
were not ripe for decision, where it appeared that neither the property to be valued nor its
actual value could be determined until the time of conveyance. Id at 146.
268 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
269 Id. at 367-70. The district court found a tendency to discourage citizen complaints
of police misconduct and to minimize the consequnces. It ordered the implementation of a
revised procedure for handling complaints.
270 Id. at 371-72.
271 Id. at 372. The majority found it unnecessary to rest on this conclusion alone, however. In their view, § 1983 would not support a cause of action for equitable relief on the
basis of the alleged inaction of the defendants. Id. at 374-78. The Court further concluded
that principles of equitable restraint and federalism precluded the relief sought, id at 37879, and that these principles are even more forceful when federal courts are asked to supervise the conduct of state judicial, legislative, or executive officials, id at 380.
Justice Blackmun, for himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented on the
ground that the trial court had found a pattern of violations of constitutional rights. He
distinguished O'Shea, for in that case, whether the named plaintiffs would be subjected to
unconstitutional practices in the future depended on whether they would first be arrested,
but the Court had assumed that they would conform their conduct to the requirements of
the law. Id. at 383-84. Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs had been injured by past police
misconduct and feared future injury regardless of whether they violated the law. Id. The
dissenters also thought it clear that equitable relief was available under § 1983 to prevent a
supervisor from consciously permitting subordinates to violate the constitutional rights of
others. Id. at 386.
272 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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thus underscores the fundamental separation of powers basis of the
Burger Court's justiciability doctrine. Pursuant to the expedited
anticipatory review provisions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, the Court reached and resolved constitutional challenges to the contribution and expenditure provisions, the reporting and disclosure provisions, and the public financing provisions
of the Act without any consideration of ripeness. It was clear that
these provisions of the Act would inevitably affect at least some of
the plaintiffs in the upcoming election, if they had not already done
so. 2 73 The court of appeals had, however, concluded that an ap-

pointments clause challenge to the exercise of certain administrative and enforcement powers by the Federal Election Commission
was not ripe, as those powers had not yet been exercised.2 7 4 The
Supreme Court reversed. In its view, the Commission had exercised some of its powers, and the "all but certain" exercise of its
other powers was imminent. 27 5 The expedited judicial review provisions of the Act created a legally protected interest in the plaintiffs to obtain an immediate determination of the constitutionality
of the provisions of the Act. 2 76 Thus, under the principle of the

Regional Rail cases, the controversy was ripe.
There is a temptation to conclude that normal ripeness principles were sacrificed to expediency in Buckley. While exercise of the
Commission's investigatory, rulemaking, and enforcement policies
may have been inevitable, there was no demonstration that the
Commission's future activities would have an adverse impact on any
of the particular plaintiffs before the Court. Thus, the result seems
superficially inconsistent with such decisions as O'Shea and Rizzo.
There was a significant point of difference, however. In Buckley, the
expedited judicial review provisions of the Act created a legally protected interest in the plaintiffs to obtain an immediate determination of the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act. It was this
protected legal interest that was immediately at stake. Thus, so
long as the controversy was sufficiently concrete to permit judicial
determination, therefore, there was no basis on which the Court
should have declined to exercise the jurisdiction that Congress had
conferred.
273 See id. at 12.
274 Id. at 115 n.157.
275 Id. at 116-17.
276 Congress was understandably most concerned with obtaining a final adjudication of as many issues as possible litigated pursuant to the provisions of § 437h.
Thus, in order to decide the basic question whether the act's provision for appointment of the members of the Commission violates the Constitution, we believe we are warranted in considering all of those aspects of the Commission's
authority which have been presented by the certified questions.
Id. at 117.
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As previously noted, 2 77 the Court found the controversy in the
Duke Power case ripe, even though the possibility of a nuclear disaster bringing the challenged limitation of liability provisions of the
Price-Anderson Act into play was remote. The Court reasoned that
the environmental injuries alleged to result from the present construction of nuclear power plants-assertedly in reliance on the
Price-Anderson limitations-were real and immediate.2 78 Although
no nuclear accident had occurred, such an occurrence "would not,
in our view, significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal
issues presented nor aid us in their resolution." 27 9 However,
delayed resolution would preclude the plaintiffs from obtaining any
relief from their present injuries, and raise doubts about the scope
of private liability for nuclear accidents. The later effect would
28 0
frustrate the purpose of the Price-Anderson Act.
The Court's approach in Duke Power was fundamentally in error. The only immediate injury was unrelated to any arguable claim
of right by the plaintiffs. And their only arguable claim of rightapplication of the limitation of liability provision-was not ripe.
The Court was motivated by its perception of the public interest in
prompt resolution of the constitutionality of the limitation of liability provision. But a principled separation of powers view of justiciability would, at the very least, have required congressional
recognition of the appropriateness of judicial review in order to
proceed, such as that in Buckley. Such recognition could not, of
course, overcome article III ripeness limitations to the extent they
are directed to ensuring adequate presentation of an issue. But by
conferring a protected legal interest on citizens immediately injured by the construction of nuclear plants it would have obviated
ripeness arguments that no protected legal interest of the plaintiffs
was immediately threatened. The approach in Duke Power should
therefore be rejected in favor of that reflected in Buckley v. Valeo.
In Babbit v. United Farm Workers National Union,2 8 1 a unanimous
Court entertained an anticipatory attack by a farm union and its
members on a variety of Arizona statutory provisions regulating agricultural employment, but held that other contentions were not
ripe. Ripeness is a showing that the operation and enforcement of
28 2
the statute presents a concrete danger of injury to the plaintiff.
277 See text accompanying notes 73-74 supra.
278 Duke Power Co.v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81-82 (1978).
279 Id. at 82.
280 Id.
281 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
282 It is enough to show that "an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably
affected with a constitutional interest" and that "there exists a credible threat of prosecution." Id. at 298.
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To meet that burden, the union need not expose itself to criminal
prosecution provided the injury sought to be avoided was "certainly impending."2 83 Under these standards, the challenge to the
statutory election procedure on the ground that it created delays
which prevented participation by many farmworkers was justiciable.
It was not essential that the union actually have invoked the statutory election procedures, because its very claim was that those procedures unconstitutionally frustrated the democratic selection of
284
bargaining representatives.
The statute also made it unlawful to discourage ultimate consumers from using agricultural products, or to use dishonest or deceptive publicity. The Court held that an anticipatory attack on this
provision was justiciable because the union had engaged and would
continue to engage in boycott activity. 2 85 The Court rejected the
argument that the matter was not justiciable because the statute
had never been enforced. The state had not disavowed its intention
to enforce the statute, and so long as the fear of prosecution was
28 6
not imaginary, the union need not expose itself to prosecution.
In contrast, the Court held that plaintiffs' challenge to a provision of the law regulating access to private property was premature.
Although UFW would undoubtedly seek such access, to anticipate
denial was "conjectural." 28 7 The Court held that these claims
could not be resolved until the appellees had an interest in obtaining access to a particular facility and could demonstrate a real
28 8
possibility that access would be denied.
In a series of subsequent decisions, the Court held that claimed
unconstitutional takings were not ripe for decision where the plaintiffs had not established that they possessed property subject to the
challenged regulation, or the controversy had not developed to the
point where the impact of the regulation could be determined.
283 Id. at 298.
284 Id. at 299-300. It was enough that UFW "has in the past sought to represent Arizona
farmworkers and has asserted in its complaint a desire to organize such workers and to
represent them in collective bargaining." Id. at 301.
285 Id. at 301.
286 Id. at 302-03. In the same way, plaintiffs' vagueness challenge to the criminal penalty
provisions of the statute was justiciable. Plaintiffs asserted that they had previously engaged and would engage in protected organizing, boycotting, picketing, striking and collective bargaining activities regulated by the statute, and they could not be sure what was
prohibited. Id. at 303. It was clear that plaintiffs wished to engage in activities prohibited
by the Act, and they should not be expected to pursue such activities at their peril.
287 Id. at 304.
288 Id. Similarly, the question of the validity of compulsory arbitration provisions of the
Act was held to be nonjusticiable because, even assuming an unlawful strike. or boycott were
to occur, "employers may elect to pursue a range or responses other than seeking an injunction and agreeing to arbitrate." Id. at 305. On the merits, the Court held that except
as to the election provisions, the district court should have abstained to permit construction
of the act by Arizona state courts. Id. at 306-13.
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Such decisions were entirely predictable, and have generated little
28 9
discussion.
In Clements v. Fashing,290 the Court permitted public officials
who wished to run for another office to challenge a provision of the
Texas Constitution providing that their candidacy would constitute
an automatic resignation from the offices they then held even
though they had not actually declared their candidacy. It was
enough that plaintiffs had alleged that but for the challenged provi291
sion, they would engage in the prohibited acts.
In its most recent and perhaps most controversial ripeness decision, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 292 a narrowly divided 5-to-4 Court
held that a citizen of Los Angeles who had been arrested for a traffic violation and subjected to a "chokehold" by the Los Angeles
police presented a justiciable claim for damages, but not for prospective injunctive relief. Justice White, for himself, the ChiefJustice, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, held that the
289 For example, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the Court held that a
challenge to a municipal zoning ordinance alleged to limit development of plaintiff's five
acre parcel to between one and five single family residences could be entertained only to
the extent that the mere enactment of the ordinance was alleged to constitute a taking. The
contention that limiting plaintiffs to less than five homes was a taking was not ripe because
plaintiffs had not submitted a plan for development under the ordinance. Id. at 260.
Similarly in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981), the Court entertained pre-enforcement challenges to the constitutionality of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 by coal producers on the ground that
the Act exceeded the scope of Congress' power under the commerce clause and violated
the tenth amendment. This result was understandable, as it was clear that the plaintiffs
were subject to the Act in their ongoing operations. However, the Court held that challenges to the Act's "steep slope" reclamation provisions were not ripe because the plaintiffs
had not identified any property in which they had an interest that had allegedly been taken
by the operation of the Act. Id. at 294. Moreover, because taking claims by their very
nature require an ad hoc factual inquiry in each case, resolution of such claims turned on
the identification of specific property claimed to have been taken. Id. at 295. In addition,
plaintiffs had not availed themselves of the opportunity to obtain a variance or a waiver. Id.
at 297.
The Court similarly declined to resolve challenges to the civil penalty provisions of the
Act where the plaintiffs did not allege that civil penalties had been assessed against them, id.
at 303-04, but it did reach and resolve a due process challenge to other provisions of the
Act where the record showed that some of plaintiffs had been subjected to such orders, id.
at 298-300. The conclusion that the due process challenge seeking prospective relief was
ripe appears to conflict with the result in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983);
see text accompanying notes 292-96 infra.
Similarly, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the Court held that the
availability of a remedy in the Court of Claims for any unconstitutional taking resulting
from the President's suspension of Iranian claims as part of the Iranian hostage settlement
was justiciable, because there must at the time of taking, be a reasonable and adequate
provision for obtaining compensation. Id. at 689. However, all parties and the Court
agreed that whether the suspension of any particular claim was an unconstitutional taking
was not ripe prior to the decision of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Id. at 688-89.
290 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
291 Id. at 962.
292 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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case was not moot because, despite its litigation moratorium, the
city might resume the practice at any time. 29 3 Nonetheless, the ma-

jority believed that the federal courts were without article III jurisdiction to entertain the claim for injunctive relief. Decisions such as
O'Shea and Rizzo were dispositive. Past exposure to illegal conduct
did not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief; rather, Lyons' "standing" to seek an injunction
turned on "whether he was likely to suffer future injury from the
use of the chokeholds by police officers." 294 The fact that he had
been choked five months previously did not establish that he would
be stopped and choked again in the future. In order to establish
that he would again be choked, Lyons would have to show that he
would be stopped for another traffic violation, and that the police
always choked any citizen they arrested or that the City authorized
them to do so.295
Justice Marshall, for himself and Justices Brennan, Blackmun
and Stevens, dissented from the majority's "fragmented" standing
analysis. If Lyons had standing to seek damages, he also should
have standing to seek injunctive relief. There plainly was a case or
controversy, and "[n]one of our prior decisions suggests that his
requests for particular forms of relief raise any additional issues
concerning his standing." 296 Lyons' claim for damages assured that
there was a live dispute and concrete adverseness regarding the
29 7
constitutionality of the City's chokehold policy.

293 Id. at 101.
294 Id. at 102, 105.
295 Id. at 105-06. Lyons' complaint alleged that the city's policy authorized chokeholds
absent a threat of deadly force. Id. at 106. The majority explained that the likelihood that
Lyons would be injured under such a policy was no more real than the possibility that injury
would occur due to his own resistance or police disobedience of their instructions. Id. The
case, thus, clearly fell within the parameters of O'Shea and Rizzo since, even assuming the
police would stop Lyons again, "it is untenable to assert. . . that strangleholds are applied
by the Los Angeles police to every citizen who is stopped or arrested." Id. at 108. Although
the police might in certain instances illegally and unconstitutionally apply strangleholds
which result in injury or death, this alone could not establish article III standing for Lyons
himself. Id.
In addition, the Court held that the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine did not apply since Lyons' claim for damages remained justiciable and he had failed to
"make a reasonable showing that he [would] again be subjected to the alleged illegality."
Id. at 109. Even assuming the pending damages claim afforded standing to seek injunctive
relief, Lyons had failed to establish the prerequisite "irreparable injury." Id. at 111. Thus,
"Lyons [was] no more entitled to an injuction than any other citizen of Los Angeles .... "
Id. The majority concluded by emphasizing that while a state is free to apply less restrictive
standing and remedial requirements, principles of federalism, equity, and comity restrain
federal courts from issuing injunctions against state administration of state criminal law. Id.
at 112-13.
296 Id. at 114.
297 The dissent argued that Lyon's complaint clearly alleged that the city's policy authorized the use of chokeholds without provocation. Id. at 120-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
O'Shea and Rizzo were distinguishable because they involved only prospective relief. Id. at
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Apart from Duke Power, the general thrust of the Burger Court's
ripeness decisions is satisfactory. The requirement that the plaintiff's asserted injury be both real and immediate is justified as a
means of assuring that a question is presented with sufficient concreteness and adversity to permit informed judicial resolution. In
Duke Power and Babbit, the Court suggested that the need for added
specificity was "prudential." However, at some point it clearly embodies a constitutionally required minimum as well. The idea that,
beyond this constitutional minimum, a court may postpone anticipatory review as a matter of judicial discretion in order to obtain a
"better" record is not objectionable in the abstract. Nonetheless,
care should be exercised to ensure that such postponements of review on "prudential" grounds do not result in denial of effective
judicial review altogether.
Apart from assuring concrete adverseness, the ripeness doctrine serves separation of powers and federalism concerns. Even if
a party might be subject to future injury of a kind arguably within
the protection of the statute or constitutional provision relied
upon, there is no need to invoke the judicial process until it can be
said with some assurance that the asserted injury will occur. Absent
such assurance, the plaintiff is indistinguishable from the general
run of citizenry-he is, in short, asserting a "generalized grievance"
the resolution of which is inconsistent with the limited role of the
federal courts envisioned by the Constitution. The concept that asserted injury be both "real" and "immediate" thus rests on the
same premises as the Court's insistence that the plaintiff assert specific and personal injury in fact, and on the additional requirement-whether it be characterized as constitutional or prudentialthat such injury have some logical nexus with the statute or constitutional provision relied upon.
The view reflected in Younger and subsequent decisions that the
existence, standing alone, of an allegedly unconstitutional statute
or practice which might in the future be applied to the conduct of
the plaintiff, does not create a justiciable controversy, was well es123-25. Once Lyons established standing to obtain some relief, federal courts could decide
what relief was available after determination of the merits. Id at 130. Regarding equitable
relief, Rizzo v. Goode was inapposite, id at 134, and all other authority concerned federal
injunctions of state criminal proceedings; thus, the principles of equity, comity and federalism underlying the Younger doctrine have little force in Lyons' case. Id. at 134-35. Moreover, an injunction was appropriate under traditional equitable principles, since choking
was unprovoked and pursuant to city policy, and since there was a future risk of death or
serious injury absent an injunction. The dissent concluded by criticizing the majority's
opinion for "immuniz[ing] persistent deprivations of constitutional rights as long as no
individual can establish with substantial certainty that he will be injured, or injured again in
the future." Id. at 137.
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tablished in prior law. 298 Where the plaintiff was engaged in a business or course of conduct that would almost certainly bring the
operation of the allegedly unconstitutional statute or practice into
play, as in Steffel v. Thompson, The Regional Rail Reorganization Cases,
Buckley, Babbitt, and Clements v. Fashing, the Court has not hesitated
to find justiciability unless there was some reason to believe that
resolution of the issue would be significantly aided by further factual development. The Court has been equally sensitive to the purpose of the DeclaratoryJudgment Act. It has repeatedly held that a
person need not expose himself to the operation of an allegedly
unconstitutional statute in order to challenge its validity. Thus, the
Court has recognized the unjustified hardships caused by some of
its pre-1970's ripeness decisions, which required the plaintiffs to
expose themselves to irreparable injury in order to invoke the
power of judicial review. 299
The Court's decisions in O'Shea, Rizzo, and Lyons, involving allegedly unconstitutional patterns of misconduct by state executive
and judicial officers, have been the most controversial. The essence
of such decisions was to deny injunctive relief not only to members
of the plaintiff class, but even to the very plaintiffs before the Court
who had themselves been subjected to the alleged unconstitutional
practices in the past. In Lyons, this principle was extended to preclude a claim for future injunctive relief even though the plaintiff
presented a justiciable claim for damages.
Such decisions are subject to criticism to the extent that they
rest in whole or in part on the view that the Younger v. Harris doctrine of equitable restraint precludes injunctive relief against
unconstitutional state executive action as well as judicial proceedings.300 On the preliminary question of justiciability, however, the
cases are consistent with the general view that a controversy is not
ripe for decision if it presents multiple contingencies regarding
subsequent application of the allegedly unconstitutional statute or
practice to the plaintiff.3 0 ' In all of these cases, there was consider298 See generally 13A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532.5 (1984).
299 See International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954); United Public Workers v. Mitchell 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
300 Younger was based on historical principles of comity applicable to state judicial proceedings, which provided an adequate forum in which the federal plaintiff might vindicate
his or her rights. 401 U.S. 37, 41-47 (1971). Broad application to state executive and administrative action not only ignores this rationale, but would vitiate the role of federal
courts as guarantors of individual rights under the Constitution and Reconstruction civil
rights statutes.
301 See, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1960); Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S.
426, 432 (1948); Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 288 (1928); Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74-75 (1927). See generally HART & WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 132 (2d ed. 1973); IOA C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
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able uncertainty whether the plaintiffs would again engage in a
course of conduct that would expose them to the allegedly unconstitutional statute or practice, and, if so, whether the statute or
practice would be applied to them. The cases were thus much different in principle from Steffel, Regional Rail, Buckley, and Babbitt,
where it was obvious that the plaintiffs desired to engage in the regulated conduct, and that the challenged statute or practice would
be applied to them if they did.302

A view of justiciability doctrine grounded in an appropriately
limited judicial role goes far to explain even the Lyons decision. If
the sole concern of standing and ripeness limitations were to assure
adequate presentation of a controversy, then Lyons' claim should
have been held to bejusticiable. There was no reason to think that
the issues on the question of injunctive relief differed significantly
from those that. would necessarily be presented with specificity on
the damages claim. But justiciability doctrine serves separation of
powers and related federalism concerns as well. It limits invocation
of the judicial power to instances in which a plaintiff can show that
relief is not only desirable, but necessary to prevent or redress injury that is personal to the plaintiff and is immediately threatened.
On this perspective, the result in Lyons, although subject to question,303 is less obviously incorrect.

The Court's apparent conviction that a plaintiff seeking future
relief against an alleged illegal statute, regulation or policy must
differentiate himself from the general run of citizens by demonstrating with reasonable certainty that he personally will be subjected to the illegality also goes far to explain (if not fully tojustify),
the Court's much criticized "causation" decisions: Linda R.S.,
SCRAP, Warth, Simon, Arlington Heights, and Allen v. Wright. In these
cases, plaintiffs sought prospective relief to prevent the future impact of asserted illegal statutes, regulations or policies. Where
standing was denied, multiple contingencies prevented the Court
from concluding that the challenged practice would have an impact
on the very plaintiff before the Court, as opposed to the class of
which the plaintiff was a member. 30 4 The Court's maligned "causaM. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2757, at 586-95 & n.25 (1983) (criticizing

but recognizing the doctrine).
302 See also United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 551-53 & 551 n.3 (1973); Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullin, 406 U.S. 498, 508-09
(1972).
303 See text accompanying note 308 infra.
304 For example, in Linda R.S., the alleged discriminatory support statute would affect
the plaintiff only if, absent the discrimination, plaintiff's spouse would be prosecuted, and
only if such prosecution would cause support to be forthcoming. In Warth, the challenged
illegal zoning practice would have a future impact on the plaintiff only if a project which the
plaintiff could afford and desired to live in would be constructed absent the zoning regula-
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tion" decisions are thus not different in principle from general ripeness doctrine, which denies justiciability to a claim for prospective
relief where it cannot be said with some certainty that the impact of
the illegality alleged will fall on this plaintiff. From this perspective,
the dissenters' argument that criminal prosecution and IRS tax exemptions may be assumed to have some effect in deterring or inducing the prohibited or exempt conduct would demonstrate only
that the challenged illegality would have an impact on members of
the plaintiff class, rather than on the plaintiff himself. Under consistent decisions of the Court, such a showing does not create a
justiciable controversy.
Most of the decisions in which the Court has found "causation" are consistent with this view. In Arlington Heights, the chain of
contingencies was reduced because a specific project which the
plaintiff could afford and asserted a desire to live in had been proposed and rejected.30 5 It was irrelevant that even if approved the
project might not be built for other reasons. It was enough that
plaintiff had shown that the challenged illegality almost certainly
would be brought to bear on him, as opposed to others in the community. In the Bakke case, the challenged admissions procedure
had been applied to the plaintiff. Thus, the controversy was ripe
and the plaintiff had standing to sue, even though if the practice
were eliminated, he might not be admitted to medical school for
other reasons. Even the SCRAP case, frequently cited as sustaining
standing based on a speculative chain of contingencies, is consistent with this analysis if a "zone of interests" view of standing is
accepted. The direct injury in SCRAP was not the possible future
environmental degradation that might result if no Environmental
Impact Statement were prepared, but the denial of the plaintiff's
statutorily protected interest in the consideration of potential adverse environmental effects before agency action was taken. The
plaintiffs not only would, but already had, felt the effects of the al30 6
legedly illegal failure to comply with NEPA.
To rationalize the Court's decisions is not necessarily to justify
them. Some of the Court's causation and ripeness decisions, which
appear to turn on the existence of multiple contingencies between
tion. In Simon ,the challenged IRS regulation could be shown to have a future impact on
the plaintiffs only if it were applied to the very hospitals in which the plaintiffs sought treatment, and only if its application caused them to alter their policies on indigent services. In
Wright, the challenged IRS enforcement policies could be shown to have a future impact on
the plaintiffs only if (1) their alteration would cause the revocation of the tax exempt status
of a significant number of private schools in the communities in which plaintiffs resided; (2)
such revocation caused them to change their admissions policies; and (3) that change
caused a resurgence of white attendance at public schools.
305 See text accompanying notes 230-34 supra.
306 Accord Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1981).

19851

JUSTICIABILITY

the challenged illegality and its impact on the plaintiff, may not
have significantly affected the vindication of individual rights. It
was possible that the plaintiff (or at least a member of the plaintiff's
class) might return to court when the matter was more developed. 3 07 The Arlington Heights case is illustrative,
In some of the Court's ripeness decisions, however, such as
O'Shea, Rizzo, and Lyons, it would clearly be impossible, on the
Court's premises, for any plaintiff sufficiently to eliminate the contingencies of enforcement to present a justiciable controversy for
prospective relief. Do these decisions represent an abdication of
the Court's responsibility to protect individual rights under the
Constitution? Or can the result be justified by the conclusion that
in most instances, the ability of an injured plaintiff to obtain retrospective compensatory relief sufficiently preserves the role of the
judiciary under article III? This was the apparent conclusion of the
Court in Lyons. But, in that setting where there was a demonstrable
risk of fatal injury for which damages could provide no relief, one
must wonder whether the balance between the need for judicial
protection of individual rights was not unduly subordinated to separation of powers and derivative federalism concerns. Whether
viewed in constitutional or prudential terms, there is no doubt that
ripeness doctrine involves difficult questions of judgment and degree: the uncertainty that the plaintiff will suffer future injury and
the need for further factual development must be balanced against
the potential hardship of denying anticipatory relief.308 Even on
the perhaps debatable assumption that retrospective damages relief
provides adequate protection against constitutional violations resulting from patterns of official misconduct in cases such as O'Shea
and Rizzo, the result in Lyons appears unduly wooden and insensitive to the Court's own constitutional role as a guarantor of individual rights.
307 For example, Warth's exclusion of those generally interested in breaking down the
barriers of exclusionary zoning policies merely required a more particularly affected plaintiff to emerge. Despite the potential irony that under the Court's doctrine, the more effective the exclusionary zoning policies were, the less likely that a qualified challenger could be
found, complete inability to challenge the zoning practicies was unlikely. Similarly, it was
not entirely clear in the tax exemption cases that it was impossible for any plaintiff to bring
a case in which the concrete impact of the challenged regulations on the plaintiff could be
predicted with certainty.
308 See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) ("The problem is best
seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to'evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial
decisions, and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration."). See generally 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 3532-3532.5
(1984).
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Mootness

As others have recognized, 30 9 the mootness doctrine is a corollary of the principles embodied in the justiciability concepts of
standing and ripeness. Because the Burger Court has taken a rigorous approach to these underlying components of justiciability,
largely on the basis of separation of powers and derivative federalism considerations, it is hardly surprising that its approach to mootness issues has sometimes been stringent as well. If explanation for
the Court's decisions is sought solely in the ability of the parties
adequately to present a controversy suitable for judicial resolution,
the result may appear artificial and hostile to the assertion of protected rights. But if the decisions are evaluated in terms of appropriate limitations on the role of the federal judiciary, they, while
occasionally subject to criticism, are at least understandable in
more value-neutral terms.
If, as I have suggested, separation of powers and federalism
concerns provide the driving and unifying force for the Burger
Court's justiciability decisions, there would be no reason for the
Court to require any particular minimum quantum or intensity of
continuing personal interest to conclude that a case is not moot. So
long as the identification of a plaintiff whose personal rights are
necessarily and immediately at stake is accomplished, the appropriateness of the Court's intervention to protect individual rights is
assured, despite the fact that the continuing effects of the challenged conduct may be ephemeral. It is enough that they exist.
Thus, the Court has endorsed preexisting doctrine that an attack on
a criminal conviction is not moot, even though the sentence has
expired, so long as there is a "possibility that any collateral legal
consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged
3 10

conviction."

309 See, e.g., Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE LJ. 1363
(1973).
310 Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632 (1982) (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 57 (1968)). It has, however, declined to apply that doctrine where a habeas corpus
attack was not focused on the validity of a conviction, as to which there are well established
and immediate collateral consequences, but on the validity of a mandatory parole term
under which plaintiffs were confined for an alleged parole violation. Id. at 632-33. In Lane,
plaintiffs sought relief from a mandatory parole term allegedly imposed on them in violation of their plea bargain and from confinement for parole violations. The Supreme Court
held that the cases were moot because the confinement had expired. Three dissenters concluded that the record of parole revocation itself had sufficient collateral consequences to
prevent mootness, id. at 634-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting), but the majority was of the view
that such collateral consequences had not been established, id. at 629 n.7., 634-36.
Although the record of parole violation might be taken into account in an employer's hiring
decision or sentencing for a future offense, these were not inevitable consequences of the
revocation, and in any event they turned on the existence of the conduct underlying the
violation rather than the record itself. Id. at 632-33. Moreover, such consequences de-
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Similarly, in Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle,31 ' the Court
held that a challenge to the state's provison of benefits to striking
workers was not moot even though the particular strike had been
settled. Employees knew that if they went on strike, public funds
would be available. Therefore, the challenged action continued to
play a role in the collective bargaining process. These effects on
the "ongoing collective relationship" were not contingent and were
"immediately and directly injurious to the corporate petitioners'
economic positions." 31 2 Moreover, because of the short duration
of economic strikes, the controversy should be regarded as "capable of repetition, yet evading review" even if the existence of an
economic strike were essential to justiciability. 31 3
In contrast, where the effects of the challenged action have entirely dissipated, a view of justiciability grounded in separation of
powers and federalism considerations would regard a judicial determination of the rights asserted to be as inappropriate as decision
of a case in which no immediate threat to those rights had ever materialized. Just as the Court has held that a controversy for past
damages does not imply a justiciable controversy for prospective
relief, so a case involving no continuing controversy at all presents
no legitimate call upon the resources of the Court.
In DeFunis v. Odegaard,3 14 a narrowly divided Court endorsed
this view, holding that DeFunis' challenge to a law school's alleged
preferential admissions policies for racial minorities was moot.
DeFunis had been admitted to the final term of law school, and defendants represented that he would be allowed to complete his academic requirements. If he did so successfully, he would graduate
regardless of the Court's decision. The Court held that regardless
of the public importance of the controversy, the requirements of
pended on remote future contingencies. Id. at 632 n.13. The majority of the Court was not
convinced that the revocation of parole in itself carried sufficient present collateral consequences to avoid mootness.
311 416 U.S. 115 (1974).
312 Id. at 124-25.
313 Id. at 125. Four dissenters concluded that justiciability was contingent on the existence of an economic strike, and that not only had the strike giving rise to the controversy
ceased long before the Supreme Court review was sought, but the threat of another strike
was entirely speculative. Id. at 127-33 (Stewart, J, dissenting).
One could attempt to read the difference in outcome between Super Tire and the parole
revocation case as reflecting a hidden substantive agenda in favor of business interests and
against those of criminal defendants, but this reads too much into the differing outcomes.
Super Tire was admittedly close to the line, with the ChiefJustice, and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist dissenting. Nonetheless, the Court's appraisal of the likelihood of immediate effects on the collective bargaining process in Super Tire seems firmly grounded in
business reality, whereas the alleged collateral consequences in Lane were subject to signifi-

cant future contingencies.
314 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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article III precluded a decision on the merits. 3 15 The result in
DeFunis seems correct. If the limited role of the federal judiciary
precludes a case from being commenced in the first instance where
the impact of the defendant's conduct on the plaintiff turns on
speculative future contingencies, as the Court has uniformly held,
then a case should equally be viewed as moot where the challenged
practices can be shown to have no present impact on the plaintiff,
and any likelihood of future impact depends on uncertain future
contingencies, as in DeFunis. It is doubtful that the Court's mootness decision in DeFunis was the product of a hidden substantive
agenda. When, in Bakke, the issue was properly presented, the
Court granted certiorari and responded with a principled substantive disposition.
The "capable of repetition yet evading review" aspect of the
mootness doctrine presents an interesting puzzle. If mootness is an
aspect of article III, then on what basis may the Court entertain a
controversy that has become moot, simply because it is subject to
the possibility of repetition? This is particularly true where the recurrence of the injury is subject to substantial contingencies. To
the extent that a Court endorses and applies the capable of repetition doctrine, one might conclude that the constitutional underpinnings of its justiciability doctrine are called into question, orcontrary to the argument here-that the only constitutional aspect
ofjusticiability is whether a controversy will be presented in a form
suitable for judicial resolution.
The Burger Court has embraced the capable of repetition doctrine in a variety of contexts. 3 16 For example, in Roe v. Wade, 3 17 the
Court concluded that a woman's challenge to a state law restricting
abortion was not moot even though the woman had delivered by
the time the case reached the Supreme Court. The Court recognized that the "usual rule" is that an actual controversy must exist
at all stages of appellate review.3 18 However, because the normal
human gestation period is so short that pregnancy litigation seldom
315 Id. at 317. This was not a controversy capable of repetition yet evading review. Nor
was it relevant that others might be subjected to the same policy in the future, for "the
respondents, through their counsel, the Attorney General of the State, have professionally
represented that in no event will the status of DeFunis now be affected by any view this
Court might express on the merits of the controversy." Id. at 317. The possibilities that
DeFunis might not graduate because of illness, economic necessity, or academic failure,
relied upon by the dissenters, were "speculative contingencies" which would not support
justiciability. Id. at 320 n.5.
316 See, e.g., Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981);
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle,
416 U.S. 115 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972).
317 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
318 Id. at 125.
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review would
would survive beyond the trial stage, and appellate
3 19
thus be impossible, the case was not moot.
Despite potentially expansive implications of this and similar
"capable of repetition" decisions, they do not undermine the constitutional underpinnings of the Court's justiciability doctrine. If
separation of powers and federalism concerns were viewed as
subordinate, one would assume that the Court would be willing to
apply the "evading review" doctrine to permit resolution of cases
where a controversy, once commenced, was capable of repetition in
the citizenry at large, without regard to the situation of the plaintiff
before the court. So long as the action was capably presented, it
would be suited for judicial resolution despite the fact that the
plaintiff might obtain no personal relief. One outstanding characteristic of the Burger Court's decisions in this area, however, has
been its clarification of ambiguities in prior law to require that a
controversy be capable of repetition, yet evading review as to the
very plaintiff before the Court.3 20 In this way the Court has maintained the underlying principle that a case is justiciable only when
necessary to protect a claimed legal interest of a party before the
rights of
Court, and not merely because the Court can say that 3the
21
some person not before the Court may be threatened.
One might argue that the same line of reasoning would imply
that the Court should hold nonjusticiable cases such as Roe, in
which the plaintiff's claim of future injury was subject to multiple
contingencies (that she would again become pregnant and again
desire an abortion prohibited by law) that would have precluded
her from instituting the action in the first instance if she had not
been pregnant. In short, if the Court took its concept of a limited
judicial role seriously, it arguably should reject the capable of repetition doctrine altogether. The conclusion, however, does not follow. The Burger Court's recognition of the continuing vitality of
the doctrine in cases in which the plaintiff's own rights are likely
again to be threatened is strong evidence that it takes seriously its
role as the ultimate guarantor of federal rights in cases of necessity.
In such cases, a real plaintiff whose rights have been immediately
threatened has attempted to obtain judicial relief. If relief is denied
because of the inherently transitory nature of his or her claim, but
319 Id.
Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than once to the
same woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it will always be
with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of non-mootness for it could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.
Id.
320 See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1974); Weinstein v. Bradford,
423 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1975).
321 See text accompanying notes 101-04 supra.
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the plaintiff is faced with a reasonable, albeit contingent, likelihood
of repetition, the Court's own essential role would be nullified unless relief could be obtained.3 22
Just as it has preserved the "capable of repetition" doctrine as
essential to adequate performance of the judicial role, so the Court
has recognized the continuing vitality of the "voluntary cessation"
doctrine, under which a defendant cannot avoid a judicial order by
cessation of the challenged conduct. 323 Absent such a rule, the essential rights-protecting role of the courts would be subject to unilateral subversion by a wrongdoer. Nonetheless, the Burger Court
has declined to find a continuing controversy even in cases of voluntary cessation where, in its view, there was no reasonable likelihood that the challenged conduct would be resumed.
For example, in another closely divided opinion, County of Los
Angeles v. Davis,3 24 the majority of the Court held that a challenge to
use of an allegedly discriminatory testing procedure was moot
where the city had replaced it with a new procedure. The conditions under which the invalidated test had been employed were
"unique," and were not likely to recur. The new hiring procedures
had resulted in high levels of minority employment, and the Court
found no evidence suggesting that the city would resume the allegedly discriminatory practices. 325 In Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler,3 2 6 the Court similarly took the view that the action of a
University president in "unequivocally" barring an all-male honor
society from campus mooted the society's action against the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 327 The society sought to prevent the Secretary from construing certain regulations to require its
322 On this ground, the Court's result in Lyons is subject to the most serious criticism.
The Court rejected application of the capable of repetition principle in that case on the
ground that the chokehold policy did not "evade review"-it was subject to review in a
damages action. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 465 U.S. 95, 109 (1983). Because of the
possibility of permanent injury or even death as a result of future application of the challenged chokehold policy, this rationale is questionable. The fact that repetition of Lyons'
injury was not certain provides no basis for rejecting application of the evading review doctrine, for by its very nature it permits claims to be maintained that would otherwise be
foreclosed under normal ripeness principles. In such circumstances, according unconstitutional executive and administrative action immunity from judicial review constitutes too
great a subversion of the role of the Court.
323 See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
324 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
325 Id. at 632. The "conservative" wing of the Court on justiciability issues-the Chief
Justice and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist-took the view that the decision to
abandon the test had been prompted by the litigation, and there was no assurance that use
of the test would not be resumed. Id. at 635, 643.
326 104 S. Ct. 373 (1983).
327 Two Justices dissented, one on the ground that the University's future conduct was
uncertain, id. at 376 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and the other on the ground that the University's "unequivocal" action might have been prompted by the challenged regulations, id. at
377 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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exclusion. While the Court's conclusions about the likelihood of
resumption of the challenged practices in these cases could be debated, they evidence no pervasive hostility to the assertion of disfavored rights.
In view of the Court's general inclination to take mootness
questions seriously, its approach in the class action setting raises
additional questions. Here, the Burger Court has held that it may
continue to adjudicate the claims of members of a certified class
even though the claims of the named representative have become
moot and are not likely to recur, and even though other members
of the class have taken no affirmative steps to assert their own
rights.
In Sosna v. Iowa,328 the Court held that even though the named
plaintiff had satisfied Iowa's challenged durational residency requirement for divorce while the case was pending on appeal, and
the controversy was not likely to be repeated as to her, the case was
not moot. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court affirmed the
traditional view that a "live controversy" must exist when the
Supreme Court hears the case. Nevertheless, the Court held that
following certification of the class, "the class of unnamed persons
described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from
the interest asserted by appellant."3 29 Provided there is a "live controversy" within the class following certification, the action may
proceed. But the plaintiff whose claim is moot is not automatically
an adequate representative: adequacy of representation is a separate inquiry. 30° Justice White dissented on the grounds that an attorney could not initiate or maintain a class action without a client
with a personal stake, that the only continuing interest in the action
was that of the class attorney, and that the Court's reliance on class
certification to avoid mootness improperly rested on a legal "fic1
tion" to satisfy a constitutional mandate.-3
Sosna's emphasis on the class as a separate legal entity for article III purposes strongly suggests that perhaps certification was the
328 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
329 Id. at 399 (footnote omitted).
330 Id. In Soma the Court treated the question of adequate representation very summarily, noting only that there was no clear lack of homogeneity in the class and that the interest of the class had been "competently urged at each level of the proceeding." L
331 lId at 412-13 (White, J., dissenting). There was some indication in Sosna that the
"capable of repetition yet evading review" doctrine might limit the scope of its holding.
The Court specifically noted that the case presented an issue which "escapes full appellate
review at the behest of any single challenger." Id. at 401. Yet in its subsequent decision in
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), the Court announced that "nothing in
[Sosna]. . .holds or even intimates that the fact that the named plaintiff no longer has a
personal stake in the outcome of a certified class action renders the class action moot unless
there remains an issue 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" Id. at 754 (footnote
omitted).
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critical event and that termination of the named plaintiff's claim
when no class had been certified would moot the controversy. Several of the Court's subsequent decisions supported this suggestion,
but others contained contrary indications. 332 These conflicting currents were resolved in United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty.333
The trial court had denied class certification simultaneously with its
ruling on cross motions for summary judgment upholding the validity of the United States Parole Commission's release guidelines.
While the case was pending on appeal, Geraghty's individual claim
was mooted by his release. The Supreme Court, by a narrow fiveto-four majority, 334 held that the action was not moot. The majority held that the article III mootness doctrine in the class action
setting consists of two aspects: whether the issues presented are
"live," and whether the named class representative has the necessary personal stake in the outcome.33 5 In Geraghty, there was a live
controversy with at least some members of the class as demonstrated by motions to intervene.33 6 As to the personal stake requirement, the Court derived a "relation back" doctrine from the
Sosna decision. 337 Mootness of the named plaintiff's claim did not
moot the entire case because a class action involves two separate
issues: the individual's claim, and the class claim. 338 Notwithstand-

ing expiration of his substantive claim, the named plaintiff had a
332 In Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 238 (1975), the Court held that
actions treated as class actions but never formally certified as such become moot upon the
expiration of the named plaintiffs' claims. The Court emphasized the importance of a formal certification decision to define those bound by the judgment. 420 U.S. at 130; see also
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). Similarly, in East Tex. Motor
Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977), plaintiffs had made no motion for class
certification, and the district court, sua sponte, denied certification simultaneously with its
ruling on the merits. The Supreme Court held that no class action could be certified on
appeal since, following trial, it was clear that the named plaintiffs were not qualified for the
positions they sought and thus were not members of the class they sought to represent. Id.
at 403. The Court stated that the result would have been different if the named plaintiffs
had been found not to be class members after the class initially had been certified. Id. at
406 n.12. In United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), the Court held that class
members were entitled to intervene for the purpose of appealing an earlier denial of class
certification following entry of a consent judgment satisfying the claims of the named plaintiffs. Id. at 393-94. The Court's holding was explicitly based on the conclusion that the trial
court's refusal to certify the class was "subject to appellate review after final judgment at
the behest of the named plaintiffs." Id. at 393. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.
463 (1978), the Court, in holding that a denial of class certification was not subject to interlocutory appeal, stated that a prevailing plaintiff might appeal the denial following the entry
of the final judgment. Id. at 468, 469.
333 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
334 The majority consisted ofJustices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, White and Stevens,
with Justice Powell, the Chief Justice, and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist dissenting.
335 445 U.S. at 396 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 484, 486 (1969)).
336 445 U.S. at 396.
337 Id. at 398.
338 Id. at 402.
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sufficient personal stake in the procedural claim for class certification to satisfy article III requirements. 33 9 Furthermore, the Court
made clear that its holding was limited to an appeal of the certification question. Only if denial of class certification were ultimately
reversed could the merits be reached. 340 As in Sosna, adequacy of
representation by the named plaintiff was a separate issue.341 Justice Powell's dissent predictably rested on the grounds that the core
article III requirement of a personal stake was not "flexible," 3 42 and
there could be no article III personal stake in a procedural decision
3
separate from the outcome of the case.

43

The dissenting opinion of Justice Powell, joined by the Chief
Justice andJustices Stewart and Rehnquist, reflects the general separation of powers concept that a live case or controversy within the
meaning of article III can continue to exist only if there is a real
plaintiff with a continuing viable claim before the Court. As this
theme pervades the Burger Court's justiciability decisions generally, should the class action decisions be regarded as inconsistent
with the Court's overall approach to justiciability questions? I suggest that they are not. The distinguishing characteristic of the class
action decisions is that Rule 23 itself legitimates a procedure which
authorizes a Court to entertain and dispose of the claims of absent
class members who have not asserted their rights, so long as adequate representation is assured and the other requirements of Rule
23 are met. Although the Rule was adopted by the Court, it acted
pursuant to validly delegated legislative power, and the Rule was
subject to congressional review and rejection under the reporting
procedures of the Rules Enabling Act.3 4 4 Given the underlying

premise of Rule 23 that, in limited circumstances, rights may be
adjudicated on a mass basis without their individual assertion, the
Court has not unduly extended its powers in relation to the other
branches by permitting the adjudication of a continuing live controversy between the defendant and absent members of a certified
class even though the claim of the class representative has become
moot. Thus, in Sosna and Geraghty the majority was correct in treating the mootness of the representative's claims as practical
problems of adequate representation rather than fundamental
339 Id. at 403-04. The Geraghty Court recognized that its holding that a party retains a
legally cognizable interest in a procedural issue divorced from the outcome of the case was
at odds with traditional mootness doctrine. But it reasoned that "[t]his 'right' is more
analogous to the private attorney general concept than to the type of interest traditionally
thought to satisfy the 'personal stake' requirement." Id. at 403.
340 Id. at 408.
341 Id. at 405-06.
342 Id. at 412 (Powell, J., dissenting).
343 Id. at 421-23 (Powell, J., dissenting).
344 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
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questions of article III jurisdiction. The Court's approach to this
area while not unanimous, goes far to repudiate the notion that the
Burger Court does not take its role as a guarantor of individual
rights seriously.
VIII.

Conclusion

A view ofjusticiability which focuses on appropriate limitations
on the role of the federal judiciary in a system of separated national
powers and reserved state powers normally requires that the rights
of the plaintiff be within the zone of interests of the statute or consitutional provisions relied upon, and that the plaintiff's alleged injury be immediately threatened. There is ordinarily no reason to
permit one whose rights clearly have not been violated to assert the
rights of others. People are the best protectors of their own rights.
In limited circumstances, however, third parties should be able
to raise the rights of others. Where there is a relationship, such as
physician-patient, which demonstrates the intent of the holder of
the right to assert it, and where it is reasonably clear-whether by
virtue of a direct proscription or an obstacle to assertion of the
right by its holder-that it is immediately threatened, the Court
does not invade the province of the other branches by permitting
the assertion of a right by third parties. Similarly, the Court has not
overstepped its powers in entertaining claims of first amendment
overbreadth where it has reason to conclude that a statute has substantial application to protected speech or conduct and those
whose rights are at stake are likely to be deterred from asserting
them. While such determinations involve difficult questions of
judgment, they nonetheless rest on premises consistent with the
Court's own role in our system of government.
A zone of interests formulation accords desirable broad scope
to the congressional role in creating standing. It also helps to differentiate the kinds of intangible interests and injuries that will support standing from those that will not. It explains why some
"generalized grievances" are sufficient to invoke the power ofjudicial review and some are not. Perhaps most importantly, it provides
a principled constitutional basis for making such determinations.
Under the Court's current articulation of the "zone," "generalized
grievance," and "third party right" standing limitations, there is
too much potential both for inexplicable inconsistency and unprincipled abdication in application of justiciability doctrine.
Just as a justiciability doctrine focused on an appropriate judicial role implies a more refined approach to the identification of
parties entitled to invoke the power of judicial review, so it implies
strong emphasis on ripeness and mootness considerations.

19851

JUSTICIABILITY

Although a case may be such that it could be adequately presented
by the parties, there is ordinarily no "necessity" for judicial review
if it is uncertain whether the plaintiff's injury will ever occur, or it
has passed with no reasonable prospect of repetition or redress.
The fact that a court may see with some assurance that others in the
plaintiff's class may be subjected to the same illegality does not create or preserve a justiciable controversy. Justiciability doctrine
grounded in separation of powers and federalism concerns would
insist that those others assert their own rights.
At the outset, this article questions whether the Burger Court's
justiciability decisions are properly viewed as the product of hostility on the merits to certain claims of right. While not all the decisions fit a single mold, this review gives scant support for that
conclusion. Among other indications that the Court is not motivated by hidden substantive agenda, but instead by more fundamental and value neutral concerns, are its willingness to accord
broad effect to congressional action, both in creating intangible interests sufficient to support standing and, as in Buckley v. Valeo, in
altering normal ripeness principles. Similarly, the Court has tolerated-admittedly by a narrow majority-a significant departure
from normal justiciability principles in the class action context.
This result is best explained by the significance of Rule 23 in enlarging the appropriate role of the Court. Hospitality to legislative
definition of the Court's role should not be viewed as the product
of political expediency. Instead, it results from the Court's recognition of separation of powers concerns as a primary ingredient of
justiciability doctrine.
The Burger Court has evidenced its sensitivity to the importance of its own role as guarantor of individual rights in other ways.
For example, it has applied ripeness doctrine in a way which amply
serves the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act by avoiding
the need to risk a costly penalty in order to obtain a judicial determination of right. It has preserved overbreadth doctrine-albeit in
more limited form-even though stringent application of the concept that judicial review is unnecessary unless a party asserts his or
her own rights might have compelled rejection of the doctrine altogether. Similarly, the Court has endorsed the capable of repetition
yet evading review doctrine. This result can best be explained as a
recognition by the Court that its own rights-protecting role requires a departure from normal ripeness and mootness principles if
effective judicial review would otherwise be precluded.
That is not to say that the Court's decisions are entirely above
criticism. There have been inconsistencies and anomalies, as illustrated by Duke Power. Such results are better attributed to the
Court's failure to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of its
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"prudential" standing rules than to naked manipulation on substantive grounds.
As many commentators have recognized, the Court's most
questionable performance has been in its application of "causation" and "redressability" considerations. Even if, as suggested
here, those decisions are viewed primarily in zone of interests and
ripeness terms, they reflect undue rigidity in the Court's perception
of its role. The Court's "chokehold" decision in City of Los Angles v.
Lyons is similarly deficient. If the result of precluding review in a
particular case is merely to postpone it until a plaintiff whose own
rights are immediately threatened comes to the fore, the Court
would stand on firm ground. But if it is to deny effective judicial
review altogether even though official conduct violating individual
rights is ongoing, the Court has unduly subordinated the role of the
federal judiciary to those of the other branches and the states. The
same Court that has been willing to accord broad sweep to the Declaratory Judgment Act, and to recognize and apply the judicially
created overbreadth and capable of repetition doctrines in appropriate cases, should be equally willing to view the permissible area
of judicial review more broadly in cases where failure to do so will
almost certainly place violations of individual rights beyond the
pale of effective review. Such applications of justiciability doctrine
would not impermissibly enlarge the role of the Court. They would
merely recognize that the separation of powers and federalism underpinnings ofjusticiability doctrine require a flexible accommodation of the Court's own role as well as those of other institutions of
government.

